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UNCERTAIN FUTURES IN EVOLVING 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
ANITA K. KRUG

 
ABSTRACT 
Today’s publicly offered investment funds, including mutual 
funds, have ever more diverse investment strategies, as they 
increasingly invest in financial instruments that, in earlier years, 
had been the province of only the most sophisticated investors. 
Although the new landscape of investment possibilities may 
substantially benefit retail investors, one financial instrument 
attracting increasing amounts of retail investors’ assets is acutely 
troublesome: the commodity futures contract. Futures originated as 
a means for farmers and other producers of agricultural 
commodities to ensure that their products could be sold at 
reasonable prices. Early on, the goals of futures regulation centered 
on one particular risk facing futures market participants—
manipulative trading that destabilizes futures markets—with little 
emphasis on other risks, including risks to futures traders’ assets. 
Over the years, that goal has remained largely static. 
As this Article argues, that is the problem. The many retail 
investors that now participate (indirectly) in the futures markets are 
at risk as a result of the inadequate regulation of futures 
commission merchants (“FCMs”), the brokerage firms that are 
essential for futures transactions. “Inadequate” regulation in this 
context, moreover, means inadequate procedural regulation—
regulation aimed at protecting assets that a brokerage customer 
deposits with a broker for purposes of carrying out her trading 
activities. The weaknesses of the procedural regulation of FCMs are 
evident in rules governing both FCMs’ operations and the 
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liquidation of insolvent FCMs. And the deficiencies are more than 
theoretical, having become all-too-evident in the wake of two recent 
FCM bankruptcies. Proposing tailored policymaking solutions, this 
Article further contends that futures regulation can become 
substantially more effective—and do so in a cost-effective manner 
that need not excessively disrupt existing regulatory approaches. 
These proposals would not only help protect retail investors as they 
navigate new investment options; they would also help fortify the 
promising role that futures trading has begun to play in twenty-first 
century financial markets.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Investment opportunities are all around us. There are thousands upon 
thousands of mutual funds and other publicly offered investment funds,
1
 
which, as the dominant investment repositories of retail investors’ 
retirement capital and other assets, have come to play a crucial role in the 
securities markets.
2
 Although one might wonder how any particular fund 
might distinguish itself from all others, at least one answer to that question 
has, in recent years, become apparent: Today’s funds have ever more 
diverse investment strategies, as they increasingly invest in assets and 
financial instruments that in earlier eras had been the province of only the 
most sophisticated investors.
3
 Indeed, funds focusing on, for example, 
international “small cap” stocks, so-called emerging economy stocks, and 
moderate-risk corporate bonds are now among the more staid investment 
programs,
4
 particularly when one considers the recent emergence of funds 
focusing on, for example, real estate, fine art, gold, and oil.
5
 It is no 
exaggeration to say that, at least in terms of the types of investments in 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Mutual Funds, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Investors/SmartInvesting/Choosing 
Investments/MutualFunds/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/GRG9-X55U; cf. 
DAVE KANSAS, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL COMPLETE MONEY AND INVESTING GUIDEBOOK 137 
(2005) (“From small beginnings early in the twentieth century, mutual funds have become a giant part 
of the financial landscape.”). 
 2. See, e.g., KANSAS, supra note 1, at 137 (“Mutual funds have become the most popular way 
for investors to participate in the financial markets.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Sam Diedrich, ‘Alternative’ or ‘Hedged’ Mutual Funds: What Are They, How Do 
They Work, and Should You Invest?, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2014, 10:29 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
samdiedrich/2014/02/28/alternative-or-hedged-mutual-funds-what-are-they-how-do-they-work-and-sh 
ould-you-invest/ (discussing the growth of mutual funds that “allow . . . investors to gain access to a 
wide range of traditionally exclusive hedge fund strategies including merger arbitrage, convertible 
arbitrage, long/short equity, macro trading, etc.” as well as “use of leverage, derivatives, and short 
selling”); Matt Levine, Hedge Fund Investors Aren’t as Dumb as They Look, BLOOMBERG VIEW (May 
30, 2014, 4:24 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-05-30/hedge-fund-investors-aren-t-
as-dumb-as-they-look, archived at http://perma.cc/5Y9T-2738 (observing that hedge fund investment 
strategies are becoming “ever more diverse”). 
 4. See Diedrich, supra note 3 (observing that the new mutual fund investment strategies are “far 
afield from traditional, ‘long-only’ mutual funds which limit themselves to buying and holding assets, 
most typically public equities or bonds”). 
 5. See KANSAS, supra note 1, at 143 (observing that “[m]utual funds have blossomed to cater to 
nearly every thinkable investing idea” and that “[t]here are funds focused on socially responsible 
investing; funds that invest [in] . . . gold, silver, wheat and oil; . . . [and] funds that invest only in 
specific sectors of the market”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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which retail investors
6
 may participate, there is no longer a sharp division 
between the banker, on one hand, and the baker, on the other. 
The developments in the range of investment possibilities open to retail 
investors are not a product of legal and regulatory developments, however. 
Rather, they are a product of the same factors that led to the first use of 
stock options in the United States in the nineteenth century and the first 
modern hedge fund—the privately offered counterpart to mutual funds—
in the 1940s. Those factors are entrepreneurial activity and human 
creativity.
7
 Of course, the emergence of new products within existing 
regulatory boundaries raises the question of whether policymakers 
sufficiently considered those products’ development at the time they 
formulated applicable regulatory strictures. After all, hedge funds are an 
investment product that arguably were not within Congress’s realm of 
consideration as it drafted exclusions to the application of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, the statute that defines and regulates mutual funds. 
And if there is any doubt about policymakers’ foresight, then—given retail 
investors’ typically more modest asset accumulation and relative lack of 
investment expertise, as compared with more sophisticated investors’ 
assets and expertise
8—there arises the further question of whether retail 
investors are sufficiently protected as they traverse the new investment 
landscape. 
In that regard, one financial instrument attracting increasing amounts of 
retail investors’ assets is troublesome: the commodity futures contract. 
Commodity futures contracts—also known as “futures contracts,” or 
merely “futures”—are, in simplest terms, agreements to buy or sell a 
particular commodity at a later time.
9
 Futures were created to help farmers 
and other producers of agricultural commodities ensure that their corn, 
 
 
 6. As used in this Article, “retail investor” refers to an individual investor who transacts in 
securities and other financial instruments for her own account but who does not qualify as a 
“sophisticated investor”—that is, an investor who meets specified wealth or income tests. 
 7. That is, there are no new laws or regulations that expressly permit funds’ broadening 
investment strategies. Rather, in pursuing the new strategies, fund managers are working within 
existing laws and rules. Alfred Winslow Jones, who began the first hedge fund in 1949, provides an 
apt historical comparison, as he launched his new product by working within longstanding regulatory 
exemptions and exclusions. See generally Carol J. Loomis, The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With, 
FORTUNE, Apr. 1966 (describing Jones’s creation of the first hedge fund). 
 8. See Jennifer O’Hare, Retail Investor Remedies Under Rule 10B-5, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 521, 
537 (2008) (observing that “retail investors are typically less sophisticated than institutional 
investors”). 
 9. See Commodity Futures Contract, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ 
commodityfuturescontract.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/R42K-HN7F 
(defining a “commodity futures contract” as “[a]n agreement to buy or sell a set amount of a 
commodity at a predetermined price and date”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/6
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cattle, cotton, or other products could be sold at reasonable prices.
10
 Such 
protection is desirable because the market price of a commodity fluctuates 
throughout the year, based on both the supply and the demand for the 
commodity at any particular time.
11
 For example, the June price of wheat 
in a given year may be substantially lower than the February price if June 
is the month in which wheat is harvested, resulting in a significant increase 
in supply that month. Accordingly, a wheat farmer who desires to secure a 
good price at harvest time may desire to “hedge” against such price 
fluctuations by locking in a particular price. She may do so by entering 
into a futures contract, pursuant to which the contract counterparty agrees 
to buy a certain amount of the farmer’s wheat in June at a specified price 
per bushel. 
Despite the origins of futures contracts, trading in futures, without ever 
receiving or delivering an actual commodity, may have value in its own 
right. As is the case with contracts that contemplate physical delivery, the 
value of a contract traded for “speculative” purposes derives from changes 
in the price of the commodity that the contract references. For example, if 
a trader expects that the price of oil will increase in the near term, she 
might initiate a futures contract on, say, 3000 barrels of oil. If the value of 
oil at the time the contract is initiated is $70 per barrel, then the value of 
the contract is $210,000. However, the trader will be able to trade in the 
contract by posting an initial margin (effectively collateral) of only a small 
portion of the value of the contract—say, $14,000. If, during the term of 
the contract, oil prices increase to $80 per barrel, then the value of the 
contract will increase to $240,000, meaning that the trader will be entitled 
to the amount of that increase, $30,000 (payable by the counterparty), 
assuming that the trader terminates the contract before the price falls 
again. From the earliest days of futures, not surprisingly, the prospect of 
using futures as a means of generating profit, rather than hedging against 
commodity price risk, did not escape financial market participants.
12
  
It is also not surprising, then, that federal regulation of futures and the 
futures markets, which dates back to the 1920s, came to reflect that futures 
are used for purposes other than hedging, that some futures contracts are 
 
 
 10. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS 
REGULATION 3–6 (1987) (describing the initial uses of futures contracts in the United States). 
 11. See Issue 1: What Drives Commodity Prices?, COMMODITYFACT.ORG, http://www. commodity 
fact.org/issues/what-drives-commodity-prices/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (citing G-20 Study Group 
on Commodities Report stating that “changes in physical demand and supply, rather than growing 
financial investments, have been the main drivers of commodity prices”). 
 12. See MARKHAM, supra note 10, at 9–10 (describing the 1880s practice of betting on 
commodity prices).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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based on assets other than agricultural commodities, and that the label 
“futures market participants” encompasses more than just farmers.13 This 
evolution is perhaps evidenced most starkly by the fact that the Grain 
Futures Act of 1922, which governed futures activities until 1936, was 
replaced by a statute with a rather more generic title: the Commodity 
Exchange Act.
14
 Still, despite regulation’s ostensible recognition of the 
breadth of futures market participation, the professed goal of futures 
regulation—prohibiting and punishing manipulative trading that 
destabilizes markets—has remained largely static.15  
That is the problem, given the mammoth expansion of participants in 
the futures markets in recent years. Almost anyone is able to trade in 
futures simply by, for example, investing in one of the growing number of 
mutual funds that does so, including as a core strategy.
16
 It is appropriate, 
moreover, that they are able to: Participation in the futures markets serves 
as a hedge of sorts even for the average investor because of the portfolio 
diversification it can provide.
17
 As this Article argues, however, those 
investors are at risk, at least in comparison to their counterparts in the 
securities markets. That risk arises from the inadequate regulation of 
futures commission merchants (“FCMs”)—that is, firms that act as 
brokers in the futures markets, executing orders through the relevant 
exchanges on behalf of their customers,
18
 whether those customers be 
 
 
 13. See id. at 12–47 (summarizing the evolution of early commodity futures regulation). 
 14. See id. at 14–25 (describing Congress’s enactment of the Grain Futures Act and, 
subsequently, the Commodity Exchange Act). 
 15. See id. at 25–28 (detailing the political context in which Congress passed the Commodity 
Exchange Act). 
 16. See Commodity Markets and Commodity Mutual Funds, ICI RES. PERSP. (Inv. Co. Inst., 
Wash., D.C.), May 2012, at 4 (“[Commodity mutual funds] allow investors, especially retail investors, 
to obtain the diversification benefits of commodity investments, benefits that were historically much 
harder to achieve.”); David Evans, How Investors Lose 89 Percent of Gains from Futures Funds, 
BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Oct. 7, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-07/how-
investors-lose-89-percent-of-gains-from-futures-funds.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9FSS-4N4A 
(discussing the increasing popularity of futures-focused mutual funds). 
 17. See Commodity Mutual Funds, MONEY-ZINE, http://www.money-zine.com/investing/mutual-
funds/commodity-mutual-funds/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/3YS9-E5LW 
(“Commodity mutual funds offer an interesting, and potentially rewarding, way to diversify an 
investment portfolio beyond stocks and bonds.”); Zacks Equity Research, 5 Commodity Mutual Funds 
to Watch in 2014-Best of Funds, NASDAQ (Apr. 8, 2014, 1:15 PM), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/5-
commodity-mutual-funds-to-watch-in-2014-best-of-funds-cm342390, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
NFD9-HDSZ (“The truth remains—commodities are among the best tools for hedging.”). 
 18. Although the early futures markets thrived outside of organized exchanges, see MARKHAM, 
supra note 10, at 3–12 (describing “the beginnings” of futures trading), today futures contracts may be 
traded only on CFTC-designated “contract markets,” see 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012), such as the Chicago 
Board of Trade, the Intercontinental Exchange, and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. See Trading 
Organizations—Designated Contract Markets (DCM), U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, 
http://sirt.cftc.gov/sirt/sirt.aspx?Topic=TradingOrganizations (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/6
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Exchange-Traded Funds or mutual funds or whether they be individual 
investors or their advisors.  
Importantly, “inadequate” regulation in this context means inadequate 
procedural regulation, a term that this Article uses to refer to regulation 
aimed at protecting cash and other assets that a participant in the financial 
markets deposits with a brokerage firm, such as an FCM or a securities 
broker, for purposes of carrying out her investment and trading activities.
19
 
Procedural regulation is to be distinguished from its (predictably labelled) 
counterpart, substantive regulation, which refers to the regulation that 
governs a broker’s performance of its services for its customers. Whereas 
substantive regulation is directed at ensuring that financial firms 
competently do what customers are paying them to do, procedural 
regulation seeks to ensure that customers’ deposits do not diminish solely 
as a result of actions by a broker that are unrelated to the services that the 
firm provides to customers. In other words, procedural regulation seeks to 
prevent the firm’s unauthorized use of customer deposits either for its own 
benefit or for the benefit of other customers. It is “procedural” in nature 
simply by virtue of its role of ensuring that customers have the procedural 
means (their deposits) to achieve their substantive ends (trading in futures 
or other financial instruments).  
That the procedural regulation of FCMs is problematic is evident from 
some key differences between that regulation and the regulation of firms 
that act as brokers in the securities markets (known formally as broker-
dealers).
20
 For example, a securities broker cannot use a customer’s 
deposits for its own investment or trading purposes without the customer’s 
consent, unless the customer has borrowed funds or securities from the 
firm—which she might do, for example, to pursue her trading activities on 
a leveraged basis or to effect “short” sales of securities.21 In that event, at 
least a portion of the customer’s deposited assets would be pledged to the 
firm as collateral and, therefore, available for the firm to use in its own 
trading activities.
22
 In addition, in the event that a deficiency, or 
“shortfall,” of customer assets exists at the time of a securities broker’s 
insolvency—the primary condition giving rise to concerns about 
protection of customer deposits—if those assets cannot be “traced” and 
 
 
 19. See infra notes 42–48 and accompanying text (elaborating on the concept of procedural 
regulation). 
 20. See infra Part II (detailing the procedural regulation applicable to securities brokers, on the 
one hand, and FCMs, on the other). 
 21. See infra notes 55–65 and accompanying text (describing the circumstances under which a 
broker might use customer funds). 
 22. See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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retrieved, customers will be made whole (up to a monetary limit) by a 
securities-specific insurance program established and administered under a 
federal statute, the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”).23 
These provisions, among others, have the effect of assuring securities 
brokerage customers that they need not fear for the safety of their 
brokerage deposits. Put another way, although most securities brokers are 
not federally regulated banking institutions insured by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), other types of procedural regulation fill 
that void,
24
 thereby promoting investor confidence in the securities 
markets. However, customers of an FCM cannot take such comfort in the 
safety of their deposited funds, thanks in part to the deficiencies of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”)—which remains the governing 
statute—and the rules of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”), the regulatory agency responsible for administering the CEA. 
That is the case even though, under the CEA, customer deposits are 
required to be segregated at all times from the FCM’s own assets.25 
As an initial matter, an FCM may invest customer assets—including 
through so-called repurchase agreements, or “repos”—regardless of 
whether the customer has borrowed from the FCM and effectively pledged 
its assets to the FCM as collateral.
26
 In addition, although there are special 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code governing the liquidation of insolvent 
FCMs, they are fraught with difficulties.
27
 On the positive side, these 
bankruptcy provisions parallel provisions that apply to insolvent securities 
brokers, and the CFTC has adopted rules that are more protective still, 
providing that, if a deficiency of customer assets exists after all efforts to 
recover them have been exhausted, customers will be compensated from 
the general assets of the FCM’s estate, with priority over the estate’s 
unsecured creditors.
28
 However, the provisions will likely be stayed in 
most FCM liquidations.
29
 Additionally, even if they are not, the protective 
CFTC rules prioritizing customers over the estate’s unsecured creditors 
may not be enforceable. If that is the case, customers would have to line 
 
 
 23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa–78lll (2012). For additional details about SIPA, see infra notes 80–91 
and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 49–91 (describing the regulatory mechanisms that help protect the assets of 
securities brokerage customers). 
 25. See infra Part II.B (summarizing the procedural regulation governing FCMs, including the 
“segregation” requirements). 
 26. See infra notes 114–19 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra Part III.B. 
 28. See infra notes 120–31 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra notes 210–17 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/6
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up with the FCM’s unsecured creditors to share in the remnants of the 
FCM’s estate.30 And, even if the special rules were to apply and even if 
they are enforceable, the estate’s assets may be insufficient, thanks to the 
fact that FCMs are typically structured as discrete components of larger 
groups of affiliated entities.
31
 On top of all of this is the fact that there is 
no insurance regime to be a last-resort aid to futures customers in the 
return of their assets. 
The concerns arising from the inadequate procedural regulation of 
FCMs are more than theoretical. The deficiences of rules that ostensibly 
protect futures customers have meant that, in the wake of two calamitous 
FCM bankruptcies in recent years—both of which involved losses of 
customer assets—customers were placed in a state of limbo, uncertain 
what laws and rules would apply and what effect those laws and rules 
might have.
32
 Indeed, in one of those bankruptcies, that of MF Global, Inc. 
in 2011, the firm’s creditors rushed to court to protect their interests while 
their counsel and advisors likewise leapt into action, as though the 
bankruptcy proceedings involved only the usual players: trustees and 
administrators, advisors, and, of course, creditors.
33
 In the flurry of 
activity, customers and their interests were all but forgotten,
34
 as though an 
FCM’s declaration of bankruptcy entails that customers no longer have 
any interests in the estate at all. 
Those circumstances are all the more alarming when one considers 
that, ex ante, customers and creditors are in substantially different 
positions. After all, creditors presumably understand the inherent risk 
associated with entering into a credit arrangement with a financial firm 
and can negotiate terms that help protect their interests.
35
 By contrast, 
customers simply entrust their hard-earned dollars with the firm, 
depositing them into an account, with the entirely appropriate expectation 
that those funds will be as safe as funds they might deposit with their 
 
 
 30. See infra notes 218–40 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra notes 252–57 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra notes 166–71 and accompanying text (describing the regulatory failures associated 
with the two bankruptcies). 
 33. See Leah McGrath Goodman, The Boy Wonder of the MF Global Nightmare, FORTUNE (Dec. 
2, 2011, 3:34 PM), http://fortune.com/2011/12/02/the-boy-wonder-of-the-mf-global-nightmare/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9AUT-XRXE (reporting on the exasperation of MF Global customers, 
who, at the outset of the bankruptcy proceedings, felt that “there was absolutely nobody looking out 
for” their interests and that they “were being ignored, even as their assets dwindled or were returned in 
sloppy fashion”). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis 
Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 569 (2011) (observing that creditors that understand relevant risks 
generally should seek to protect their interests through ex ante negotiations). 
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banking institutions—and that they will be available for the customers’ 
exclusive use.
36
 Practically since the beginning of futures regulation, 
moreover, those expectations have been amply supported by a frequent 
refrain in the futures industry: Customer funds are safe and secure.
37
  
MF Global is not the only example. From the earliest days of FCMs 
onward, there have been segregation problems, producing substantial and 
devastating losses for customers.
38
 Some losses have arisen from FCMs’ 
failure to separate customer assets from the FCMs’ own assets;39 others 
have been a product of customer defaults—meaning an FCM’s 
inappropriate use of (most) customers’ deposits to support trades of other 
customers who have exhausted, and failed to replenish, their deposited 
funds.
40
 Although these losses may not be apparent while an FCM is in 
good health, the firm’s insolvency—and the associated need to return 
deposited assets to customers—make any such shortfalls glaringly evident. 
Beyond contending that futures customers’ deposits are not, in fact, 
safe and secure, this Article shows why that is the case and posits that the 
problems can be corrected in a manner that need not excessively disrupt 
the existing futures regulatory regime or create excessive costs or other 
externalities for creditors or other third parties. Accordingly, Congress and 
the CFTC should act now. Waiting to take action will only create further 
risks—for customers, for the futures markets, and for the promising new 
era of near-universal participation in those markets.  
Addressing the formidable concerns this Article identifies is more than 
simply a matter of achieving better customer protection. It is also a matter 
 
 
 36. See Paul Sullivan, In Commodities World, Safe and Secure Sometimes Isn’t, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/your-money/in-commodities-world-safe-and-
secure-sometimes-isnt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting that, before MF Global’s collapse, 
“segregated accounts had been seen as stronger than the deposit insurance offered by banks that are 
members of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the protection on securities, like stocks and 
bonds, given by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation”). 
 37. See Peter Elkind & Doris Burke, The Last Days of MF Global, FORTUNE (June 4, 2012, 7:17 
PM), http://fortune.com/2012/06/04/the-last-days-of-mf-global/, archived at http://perma.cc/BM8Z-
328W (“Industry groups routinely boasted that no customer had ever lost a penny because of a 
bankruptcy.”); Marc Nagel, MF Global Bankruptcy Files a “Disgraceful Disconnect,” FUTURES (Dec. 
19, 2011), http://www.futuresmag.com/2011/12/18/mf-global-bankruptcy-files-disgraceful-disconnect, 
archived at https://perma.cc/8BKA-RNN8 (“We in the futures industry are guilty in repeating the 
phrase that no one has ever lost money because of the failure of an FCM.”). 
 38. See MARKHAM, supra note 10, at 30 (noting that the national commodity futures regulator at 
the time, the Commodity Exchange Authority, in its examination of 654 FCMs between September 
1937 and August 1938, found that over 100 of them were “undersegregated” and that one such firm 
was placed in bankruptcy, resulting in losses to its customers of 54% of their account balances). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. at 88–89 (describing one such bankruptcy, that of Volume Investors, Inc., which 
occurred in 1985). 
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of bringing futures regulation into the twenty-first century, situating it in 
the same sphere as securities regulation.
41
 Perhaps because the regulation 
of securities and other financial markets traditionally has emphasized the 
goal of investor protection in addition to (or perhaps ahead of) the 
traditional futures regulatory goal of mitigating market manipulation, 
Congress and regulators have been more vigilant in ensuring 
commensurately broad procedural protections in those other arenas. If the 
futures markets are the up-and-coming “securities markets” of this era, 
albeit on a lesser scale, procedural regulation of them and the brokerage 
firms that facilitate them needs to rise to the occasion. That is, it must 
create a more certain future for retail investors and other futures market 
participants. 
Focusing on procedural regulation in both the securities brokerage and 
futures brokerage contexts, Part II shows that, although customer 
protections in the two realms are in many ways similar, critical differences 
nonetheless exist. Part III delves more deeply into the procedural 
protections of futures customers, highlighting the ways in which they are 
deficient, particularly in comparison to the protections afforded customers 
transacting in securities. Part IV turns to regulatory reform, proposing 
policymaking solutions that can readily be incorporated into the existing 
procedural regulatory regime governing futures brokers. In addition, it 
argues that such reform is critical not only for maintaining customer 
confidence in the futures markets, but also for making futures regulation 
compatible with the role that futures trading has assumed in modern 
financial markets. Part V concludes by addressing why the concerns this 
Article tackles have not heretofore received significant attention, either in 
the academy or elsewhere. 
II. PROCEDURAL REGULATION 
Statutory provisions and rules governing brokerage firms may be 
divided into two categories, depending on the objective of any particular 
provision or rule. These categories are, first, the regulation of the activities 
or steps that are preconditions to a broker’s provision of its services and, 
second, the regulation of the substance of those services. For example, 
securities laws and rules require that a securities broker that has “custody” 
of customer assets—that, in other words, is the entity with which a 
customer deposits her funds—designate those assets as belonging to the 
 
 
 41. See infra Part IV.B. 
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customer and ensure that the assets may be used only for particular 
purposes.
42
 Those custody-related requirements are distinctly procedural, 
in that they have nothing to do with the objective behind the customer’s 
placement of the assets with the broker, which, one might suppose, is to 
use them to effect securities transactions. Relevant laws and rules also 
regulate how a broker fulfills that objective—how it carries out its services 
of effecting transactions for the customer.
43
 The requirements that this 
second type of regulation imposes are substantive, in that they pertain to 
the substance of the services that the broker provides to its customers. 
Both regulatory purposes are critical, however, in that substantive 
regulation becomes relevant only if procedural regulation does its job: 
ensuring the integrity of customer deposits so that they may be deployed 
for customers’ investment and other financial activities.  
In the procedural sphere, the regulation that governs brokers presently 
relies on three dominant regulatory mechanisms. First, regulation uses 
what might be called operational requirements. These are requirements 
that a broker, as it carries out its operations, follow certain procedures 
designed to protect customer deposits.
44
 The efficacy of operational 
requirements, moreover, may be readily evaluated upon the occurrence of 
one signal event: insolvency. Typically, only when a broker becomes 
insolvent can it be known whether operational requirements have 
adequately protected customer deposits, as there will either be a deficiency 
of those assets—fewer assets than customers’ aggregate claims on them—
or there will not be. Before the firm becomes insolvent, after all, should a 
customer wish to withdraw all of her assets, she will almost certainly be 
able to do so. For the firm, even if there are insufficient customer assets 
overall, satisfying a single customer’s request in full is simply a matter of 
robbing Peter to pay Paul, as it were. That is, pre-insolvency, if a 
deficiency of customer assets exists, no one need know, since funding a 
sporadic withdrawal is merely a matter of having sufficient assets 
somewhere within the firm that can be drawn upon.
45
  
 
 
 42. See infra notes 70–74 and accompanying text (describing the custody requirements that apply 
to securities brokers). 
 43. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (2012) (prohibiting securities brokers’ use of deceptive, fraudulent, or 
manipulative devices); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-7 (2016) (providing that a securities broker that has 
discretionary investment authority as to a customer’s account may not effect purchases or sales “which 
are excessive in size or frequency in view of the financial resources and character of such account”). 
 44. For a discussion of operational requirements in the securities and futures brokerage contexts, 
see infra notes 49–74, 93–119 and accompanying text. Although some operational requirements serve 
the ends of procedural regulation, many others pertain to the substantive ends of regulation, namely the 
services a firm provides to its customers.  
 45. See Complaint at 14–15, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. MF Global Inc., No. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/6
  
 
 
 
 
2016] UNCERTAIN FUTURES IN EVOLVING FINANCIAL MARKETS 1221 
 
 
 
 
Second, procedural regulation uses bankruptcy laws and rules in order 
to help mitigate the effects of insolvency. In particular, in 1978, Congress 
enacted special provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to apply to brokerage 
firm insolvencies, and the relevant regulatory agencies (the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the CFTC) adopted associated rules 
pursuant to their authority under those provisions.
46
 These provisions and 
rules prioritize brokerage customers over creditors in the liquidation 
process.
47
 Third, procedural regulation relies on insurance, in the form of 
pools of funds that may be tapped for purposes of compensating customers 
of bankrupt firms under appropriate circumstances.
48
  
The remainder of this Part discusses the core procedural laws and rules 
used in the securities and futures brokerage contexts. Focusing on the 
securities brokerage context, Part II.A provides a comparative perspective 
that sets the stage for Part II.B’s discussion of the procedural regulation of 
futures brokerage firms. Although differences between the securities 
markets, on the one hand, and the futures markets, on the other, clearly 
account for part of the discrepancy in customer protection in the two 
contexts, they cannot account for all of it.  
A. Securities Brokers 
To protect customer assets, the regulatory regime governing securities 
brokers relies to some extent on each of the three tools noted above. 
Arguably, however, its specialized insurance regime provides more robust 
protection than do its operational requirements or the provisions of the 
 
 
13-cv-4463 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@l 
renforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfmfglobalcomplaint062713.pdf [hereinafter CFTC 
Complaint] (detailing MF Global’s use of customer funds to “meet the liquidity needs of [the firm’s] 
proprietary trading activities”); see also infra Part III (discussing the phenomenon of inappropriately 
drawing on certain accounts to cover obligations of other, depleted accounts in the days prior to MF 
Global’s bankruptcy). 
 46. See infra notes 75–79, 120–31 and accompanying text (describing the Bankruptcy Code 
provisions in the securities and futures brokerage contexts). 
 47. See infra notes 75–79, 120–31 and accompanying text. 
 48. See infra notes 80–90 and accompanying text (describing insurance protection in the 
securities brokerage context). 
 Meaningful civil and criminal penalties might, of course, constitute a fourth tool of regulation. 
However, past experience has demonstrated that penalties are not particularly strong deterrents in the 
procedural regulatory context. Indeed, the enforcement mechanisms available to the CFTC and the 
SEC are far from toothless, yet troublesome events continue to emerge, as the financial crisis 
demonstrated on a large scale and as ongoing FCM bankruptcies—and the customer losses they often 
produce—have demonstrated on a smaller scale. See supra notes 38–40, infra notes 151–61 and 
accompanying text (detailing historical and current FCM bankruptcies that have produced customer 
losses). Accordingly, this Article does not include penalties among the other tools. 
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Bankruptcy Code that apply to securities broker insolvencies. Nonetheless, 
the latter two tools support the insurance regime and, presumably, reduce 
the likelihood that the insurance pool will need to be tapped. This Subpart 
describes each of the tools and the role that each plays in protecting the 
deposits of securities brokerage customers. 
Operational requirements governing securities brokers are set forth in 
four sources—namely, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange 
Act”),49 the SEC’s rules under the Exchange Act,50 the Federal Reserve’s 
Regulation T,
51
 and the rules of the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”), which is the self-regulatory organization for the 
securities industry.
52
 To understand these requirements, it is necessary to 
understand the nature of the relationship between securities brokers and 
their customers: Most securities brokerage customers are investors or 
traders—be they individuals, businesses, endowments, hedge funds, or 
mutual funds—that wish to transact in securities. Toward that end, these 
investors establish accounts with one or more brokers and use the funds 
they deposit in those accounts to buy and sell securities.
53
 The broker 
typically acts as the intermediary, procuring a seller or a buyer for each of 
the investors’ securities transactions.54 At any given time, then, an 
investor’s brokerage account will typically hold a certain mix of cash and 
securities.  
This picture is complicated, however, by one critical factor. The 
Exchange Act provides that securities brokerage account arrangements 
may authorize an investor—a brokerage customer—to borrow “on 
margin.”55 With such an arrangement, the customer may borrow additional 
funds from the broker to use for her securities trading and investment 
activities.
56
 Alternatively, she may borrow securities from the broker that 
 
 
 49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o–78o-3 (2012). 
 50. 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2016). 
 51. 12 C.F.R. pt. 220 (2016). 
 52. See FINRA Rules, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=24 
03&element_id=607 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9DM4-5MRN. 
 53. See, e.g., Jonas Elmerraji, Picking Your First Broker, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www. 
investopedia.com/articles/younginvestors/06/firstbroker.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/MD4Y-JCFN (“[Y]ou can’t start investing if you don't have a brokerage account.”). 
 54. See Broker, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/broker (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/Q4ZY-QSGY (describing the function of various 
types of brokers, including securities brokers). 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (2012) (setting forth certain requirements governing brokers’ extension of 
credit to customers). 
 56. See Margin: Borrowing Money to Pay for Stocks, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/margin.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/4N53-
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she then uses to effect so-called short sales, selling the borrowed securities 
and later buying the same quantity (hopefully at a price that is lower than 
the price at which she sold) in order to repay her loan.
57
 Regardless of the 
type of borrowing, by virtue of the arrangement, the customer is able to 
increase the possible magnitude of her investment profits, as well as the 
possible magnitude of her losses, beyond what would be feasible in the 
absence of the arrangement.
58
 She is able to, in other words, “leverage” the 
balance of her account.
59
 
In connection with a broker’s lending funds or securities to a customer, 
a certain portion of the securities or other assets in the customer’s account 
will be deemed collateral for the loan (accounted for in a so-called 
“margin account”), pledged to the broker for so long as the loan remains 
outstanding.
60
 In theory, the result of that circumstance is the same as in 
any lending context. If the customer does not repay the loan, the firm may 
lay claim to the encumbered assets.
61
 Another, and more significant, result, 
however, is that the lending arrangement also typically constitutes 
authorization for the broker to “rehypothecate” the margin account’s 
assets—that is, to use them for its own investment and trading activities.62 
 
 
XQVT [hereinafter SEC Brochure] (“‘Margin’ is borrowing money from your broker to buy a stock 
and using your investment as collateral.”). 
 57. See The Basics of Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/ 
investing/100913/basics-short-selling.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
8SQS-HSVR (describing the mechanics of a short sale). 
 58. See SEC Brochure, supra note 56 (observing that “[i]nvestors generally use margin to 
increase their purchasing power so that they can own more stock without fully paying for it” but that 
“margin exposes [them] to the potential for higher losses”). 
 59. See Leverage, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leverage.asp (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/N6JP-33LV (defining “leverage” as “the use of various 
financial instruments or borrowed capital, such as margin, to increase the potential return of an 
investment”). 
 60. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g (2012) (setting forth margin-related requirements); Margin Account, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marginaccount.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/M5RT-Q5A8 (defining “margin account” as “a brokerage account in 
which the broker lends the customer cash to purchase securities” and noting that “[t]he loan in the 
account is collateralized by the securities and cash”). 
 61. See Investing with Borrowed Funds: No “Margin” for Error, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ 
investors/alerts/investing-borrowed-funds-no-margin-error (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/WL3E-XTQ8 (describing how margin accounts work). 
 62. See Rehypothecation, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rehypothecation 
.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8AZT-3JSE (defining rehypothecation as 
“the practice by banks and brokers of using, for their own purposes, assets that have been posted as 
collateral by their clients”). Although customer consent is required for this use, see FINRA Rules, 
supra note 52 (prohibiting brokers, in Rule 4330(a), from “lend[ing] securities that are held on margin 
for a customer and that are eligible to be pledged or loaned” unless the broker has first obtained the 
customer’s consent), that consent may be part of the documentation by which the customer opens her 
account or, if separate, the lending agreement. See id. (permitting, in supplementary materials to Rule 
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Among other things, the firm might use the assets as collateral for its 
repurchase agreements—effectively short-term borrowing arrangements 
on which brokers rely heavily to meet day-to-day needs for cash or 
particular securities.
63
 Or, the firm could use cash in the account to enter 
into resale (or “reverse repurchase”) arrangements, in which the broker 
effectively makes a short-term loan to another firm, receiving securities as 
collateral.
64
 The firm could also lend the securities to other customers for 
use in those other customers’ short selling activities.65  
At any given time, then, although the broker keeps track of the amount 
that each customer would be entitled to receive if the customer were to 
repay all borrowings from the firm and close her account, if all customers 
were to close their accounts simultaneously, the firm would be unable to 
satisfy its payment obligations to them.
66
 Yet that is effectively what either 
precipitates or follows from a broker’s insolvency. That is, either too many 
customers seek to withdraw their account balances, thereby leading to 
insolvency, or the firm’s own investment, trading, and borrowing 
activities—whether carried out through borrowing customers’ assets or 
not—drain the firm’s assets, leading to insolvency and the resulting need 
to liquidate customers’ accounts.67 Regardless of the cause of the 
insolvency, the result may be the same, in that the amount of assets that 
the firm holds for customers may be less than customers’ legitimate claims 
 
 
4330(a), a customer account agreement to include customer consent for the broker’s lending of margin 
securities).  
 63. See Definition of Repurchase Agreement, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term 
=repurchase-agreement (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/83D2-ZYZU (noting 
that a repurchase agreement is “a type of short-term loan . . . whereby the seller of a security agrees to 
buy it back at a specified price and time” and that “[t]he seller pays an interest rate, called the repo 
rate, when buying back the securities”).  
 64. “Repos” and “reverse repos,” as they are called, are simply two sides of the same coin: In any 
given transaction, one party has entered into a repo, while its counterparty has entered into a reverse 
repo. See Repurchase Agreement—Repo, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/ 
repurchaseagreement.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6APY-DLLW (“For 
the party selling the security (and agreeing to repurchase it in the future) it is a repo; for the party on 
the other end of the transaction, (buying the security and agreeing to sell in the future) it is a reverse 
repurchase agreement.”). 
 65. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining short sales). 
 66. After all, at a minimum, it is likely that at least some customer securities will have been 
loaned to others for purposes of facilitating short selling activity. See Short Sales, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (noting that 
“[b]rokerage firms typically lend stock to customers who engage in short sales,” using, among other 
sources, “the margin account of another of the firm’s customers”).  
 67. The latter cause arguably led to the 2008 collapse of Bear Stearns. See, e.g., Bryan Burrough, 
Bringing Down Bear Stearns, VANITY FAIR (June 30, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/ 
news/2008/08/bear_stearns200808-2 (describing the reasons for the firm’s collapse).  
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to them.
68
 Moreover, because brokers have the ability to borrow cash and 
securities from customers and to collateralize those loans with various 
types of assets, the assets that are available may be of a different cash-
securities mix than what would otherwise be the case.
69
 
Although this description of typical securities brokerage arrangements 
may suggest that securities brokers are subject to few operational restraints 
in their handling of customer assets, in fact they are subject to many. 
Whereas a broker generally may use a customer’s margin assets for a 
variety of purposes unrelated to the services it provides to the customer, 
the firm must adhere to certain procedurally focused operational 
requirements as to any other assets—that is, any unencumbered assets—
the customer may hold with the firm.
70
 Pursuant to these operational 
requirements, which are largely contained in the SEC’s rules under the 
Exchange Act, a broker must maintain a reserve bank account for the 
exclusive benefit of customers, the minimum balance of which is 
determined based on a formula that nets the amount that the firm owes to 
its customers against the amount that customers owe to it.
71
 The intention 
behind this reserve requirement is to ensure that securities brokers refrain 
from inappropriately using their customers’ assets for their own activities, 
whether they be trading or business related.
72
 In addition, the firm must 
maintain possession and control of those unencumbered assets
73—and, 
therefore, must refrain from lending or selling them unless the broker 
 
 
 68. To retrieve their deposits, customers—like the firm’s secured and unsecured creditors—will 
be required to submit a formal claim to the estate’s administrators. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS 68 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Federal 
Courts/BankruptcyResources/bankbasics2011.pdf [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY BASICS] (observing that a 
customer of a bankrupt brokerage firm must file a “written statement of claim”). 
 69. This possibility follows from the fact that a broker may engage in repos and reverse repos 
with customer assets. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 70. “Unencumbered assets” in this context are cash and securities that are not encumbered by the 
customer’s obligations to the firm and include so-called “fully paid” securities—that is, securities 
purchased without use of a loan from the firm—and “excess margin” securities—which are securities 
that the customer may have purchased through use of the firm’s funds but that are in excess of the 
amount required to be pledged as collateral for the loan. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(a)(3), (5) (2016) 
(defining “fully paid securities” and “excess margin securities,” respectively).  
 71. See id. § 240.15c3-3(e) (setting forth reserve requirements). 
 72. See Thomas W. Sexton, Nat’l Futures Ass’n, Comments on Proposed Rule: Applicability of 
CFTC and SEC Customer Protection, Recordkeeping, Reporting, and Bankruptcy Rules and the 
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 to Accounts Holding Security Futures Products, 2001 WL 
34790034, at *2 (Dec. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Sexton Comments] (observing that the reserve 
requirement seeks to ensure that “broker-dealers do not use customer funds to fund their own business 
and trading activities”).  
 73. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b) (setting forth requirements for the “physical possession or 
control” of customer securities).  
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complies with various requirements.
74
 Taken together, these operational 
requirements aim to give customers exclusive use and withdrawal rights as 
to their assets that are not needed to “support” their borrowings from the 
broker.  
The operational requirements that apply to securities brokers are 
intended to ensure that, notwithstanding the many uses to which a firm 
may put customer assets, the firm must also maintain some reasonable 
measure of customer protections. Serving as a backstop to these 
requirements is a second procedural regulatory tool: provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, contained in subchapter III of chapter 7,
75
 which specify 
the procedures to be followed in the liquidation of insolvent securities 
brokers.
76
 Pursuant to those provisions, the trustee of an insolvent broker 
must distribute “customer property” to the customers ratably based on 
customers’ “net equity” claims.77 More importantly for customer 
protection purposes, and as noted above,
78
 customers’ claims on that 
property have priority over all other claims on the firm’s aggregate estate, 
with the exception of claims made to cover costs arising from the 
administration of the estate.
79
  
 
 
 74. First, if a securities broker wishes to borrow a customer’s fully paid securities for purposes of 
lending them to other customers wishing to sell the securities short, the customer must not have 
exercised her right under the Exchange Act to opt out of allowing such lending. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(e) 
(2012) (providing a right for customers to opt out of lending securities in their accounts). In addition, 
if, as a result of the lending arrangement, the firm actually uses the customer’s securities in furtherance 
of other customers’ short sales, the firm must notify the customer that the firm may be compensated 
for doing so. See id. Second, prior to entering into a lending arrangement involving fully paid or 
excess margin securities, the firm and the relevant customer must enter into a written agreement that 
sets forth the compensation to the customer and the parties’ respective rights and obligations with 
respect to the loan. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b)(3) (setting forth the agreement requirement). Third, 
pursuant to a FINRA rule, the broker must “have reasonable grounds for believing that the customer’s 
loan(s) of securities are appropriate for the customer” and exercise “reasonable diligence” in making 
that determination. See FINRA Rules, supra note 52 (setting forth, in Rule 4330(b), requirements 
governing a broker’s use of fully paid and excess margin securities). Other requirements include that 
the firm provide collateral to the customer consisting of cash or US Treasury bills or certain other 
liquid and low-risk assets, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b)(3)(iii)(A), and establish the value of the 
loaned securities on a daily basis (and, if necessary, provide additional collateral to the customer). See 
id. § 240.15c3-3(b)(3)(iii)(B). 
 75. 11 U.S.C. §§ 741–753 (2012).  
 76. In a bankruptcy brought under subchapter III, other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 
continue to apply, including chapter 11’s general provisions, certain provisions of both chapter 3 and 
chapter 5, and chapter 7’s other provisions except to the extent otherwise specified in subchapter III. 
Cf. In re Griffin Trading Co., 245 B.R. 291, 302 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 
270 B.R. 882 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (reciting the provisions that apply in a bankruptcy proceeding under 
subchapter IV of chapter 7, which pertains to FCM bankruptcies). 
 77. See 11 U.S.C. § 752(a) (2012) (“The trustee shall distribute customer property ratably to 
customers on the basis and to the extent of such customers’ allowed net equity claims . . . .”).  
 78. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 79. See § 752 (setting forth the priority requirement and its exception). 
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It is not worth delving too deeply into the details of subchapter III, 
however, because, in practice, its provisions are overshadowed
80
 by the 
third tool—the insurance regime provided by the Securities Investor 
Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”).81 SIPA’s insurance program is 
predicated on the special risks arising from brokers’ arrangements with 
their customers. In particular, the statute created a broker-funded insurance 
pool to be used to compensate customers of insolvent securities brokers 
whose accounts, at the time of the insolvency, do not contain all of the 
cash, securities, and other assets necessary to satisfy customers’ net equity 
claims.
82
 In other words, the insurance pool is designed to return to 
customers the amount of missing cash and securities (less any cash, 
securities, or other assets the customer owes the firm),
83
 subject to a cap of 
$500,000, no more than $250,000 of which may consist of cash.
84
  
SIPA’s insurance regime is administrated by a non-profit corporation 
that SIPA created, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation 
(“SIPC”).85 Any securities broker that is a depository of customer assets—
by no means the universe of brokers
86—must be a SIPC member and make 
annual contributions to the insurance pool.
87
 Accordingly, upon a broker’s 
insolvency, if it appears that SIPC’s involvement is necessary—and 
assuming that the firm is a SIPC member—SIPC, pursuant to its authority 
under SIPA, typically will ask the bankruptcy court to appoint a SIPC-
 
 
 80. Subchapter III is rarely used, see In re Griffin Trading Co., 245 B.R. at 302 (“Congress . . . 
recognized that the Bankruptcy Code would apply to stockbroker liquidations only in very rare 
cases.”), given that securities brokers are liquidated under SIPA. See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 
68, at 64 (citation omitted) (“Although the Bankruptcy Code provides for a stockbroker liquidation 
proceeding, it is far more likely that a failing brokerage will find itself involved in a proceeding under 
[SIPA], rather than a Bankruptcy Code liquidation case.”). 
 81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa–78lll (2012). 
 82. See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection Act, 
Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1096 (1999) 
(observing that “the SIPC fund will cover the shortfall” in the event an insolvent broker’s estate has 
insufficient customer assets to satisfy customers’ claims). 
 83. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-4 (2012) (setting forth customer payment procedures). 
 84. See id. § 78fff-3(a), (d) (providing for maximum payment amounts per customer). 
 85. See SIPC Mission, SEC. INVESTOR PROTECTION CORP., http://www.sipc.org/about-sipc/sipc-
mission (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (observing that “SIPC was created under [SIPA] as a non-profit 
membership corporation” and that “[i]n a liquidation under [SIPA], SIPC and the court-appointed 
Trustee work to return customers’ securities and cash as quickly as possible”). As an acronym, SIPC is 
pronounced “Sip-ick.” 
 86. Because some securities brokers do not hold customer deposits, their activities cannot put 
customer deposits at risk. Accordingly, they are not required to be SIPC members. See 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78ccc(a)(2), 78ddd(c) (2012) (setting forth SIPC’s membership and assessment requirements). Such 
brokers may, however, join SIPC voluntarily. See S. REP. No. 91-1218, at 4 (1970) (noting that 
becoming a SIPC member is voluntary for non-depository brokers). 
 87. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ccc(a)(2), 78ddd(c). 
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associated trustee to administer the firm’s estate, including to oversee the 
payment of insurance proceeds to any affected customers.
88
 In those 
circumstances, moreover, the brokerage-firm specific provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code are stayed.
89
 
Congress enacted SIPA for much the same reason that it has adopted 
all securities statutes: to protect investors and maintain their confidence in 
the securities markets.
90
 More specifically, it sought to further those goals 
by ensuring the procedural protection of investors’ capital. Regardless of 
how flagrantly a broker might disregard operational requirements or how 
severely it might overextend itself in its trading and borrowing activities, 
customers will be protected, at least to the extent that the amounts of their 
respective insurance claims are less than the cap.
91
 As the next Subpart 
discusses, Congress’s approach to regulating futures brokers is 
considerably different.  
 
 
 88. See id. § 78eee (setting forth the required procedures for the appointment of a SIPC trustee). 
 89. See 11 U.S.C. § 742 (2012) (providing that SIPC’s filing of an action for a protective decree 
under SIPA “stays all proceedings in the case under [the Bankruptcy Code]”). 
 90. See About SIPC: History and Track Record, SEC. INVESTOR PROTECTION CORP., 
http://www.sipc.org/about-sipc/history (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
Q3G9-VC2P (“SIPA’s purpose is to protect customers against certain types of loss resulting from 
broker-dealer failure and, thereby, to promote investor confidence in the nation’s securities markets.”). 
 91. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (describing SIPA’s coverage limitations). Of 
course, protecting investors was presumably not Congress’s only objective. The insurance regime also 
serves the salutary cause of maintaining liquidity in the markets at times of financial stress. Cf. Charles 
W. Colomiris, Runs on Banks and the Lessons of the Great Depression, 22 REG. 1, 4 (1999), available 
at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1999/4/deplesson.pdf (observing 
that, without insurance protection, bank customers’ concerns about bank solvency can “cause 
otherwise solvent banks to fail and produce chaos in the payment system and in credit markets”). 
Without the protection of customers’ brokerage funds that SIPA provides, customers would likely 
remove those assets at the first hint that their broker is experiencing financial difficulties—a 
phenomenon that famously produced the “bank runs” leading up to the Great Depression. See id. 
(explaining the phenomenon of bank runs). That result would, in turn, hinder the firm’s continued use 
of repurchase agreements or other arrangements for short-term funding, thereby hindering its ability to 
loan capital and securities to other customers, to satisfy its obligations under swap and other 
agreements to which it is a party, and to maintain its investment and trading activities. See HAL S. 
SCOTT, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION 2 (2012), 
available at http://www.aei.org/files/2013/01/08/-interconnectedness-and-contagion-by-hal-scott_ 
153927406281.pdf (evaluating “the impact of [Lehman Brothers’] insolvency on its creditors, 
including derivatives counterparties, prime brokerage clients, [and] structured securities investors”). 
Those results, without more, reduce the ability of others to transact in the financial markets and may 
have the further effect of nudging other institutions down a similar path. Nevertheless, given some 
important drawbacks to an insurance regime, insurance is not necessarily always the optimal approach. 
See infra notes 293–98 and accompanying text (explaining why insurance is not an ideal approach for 
improving FCM regulation). 
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B. Futures Brokers 
Just as transacting in securities typically requires the assistance of a 
securities broker, transacting in futures contracts usually necessitates the 
use of a futures broker—an FCM.92 And the regulation of FCMs 
generally—but not completely—relies on a combination of the same types 
of procedural tools that govern securities brokers, although these tools are 
formulated differently and have different underlying rationales. The one 
significant exception, however, is that there is no third mechanism of 
procedural regulation, as articulated in the previous Subpart. There is, in 
other words, no last-resort insurance regime similar to SIPA’s. This 
Subpart discusses Congress’s and the CFTC’s approach to the procedural 
regulation of FCMs and the role that each mechanism plays in protecting 
futures customer assets.  
Much like the regulation of securities brokers, the operational 
requirements governing FCMs spring from multiple sources. As suggested 
above, the regulatory structure governing FCMs is set forth in the CEA,
93
 
which the CFTC has fleshed out and elaborated through the rules it has 
adopted pursuant to the authority that Congress granted it under the 
CEA.
94
 In addition, the CEA and associated rules are supplemented by 
rules adopted and enforced by multiple self-regulatory organizations 
(“SROs”), such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”), which is 
also a futures exchange, and the National Futures Association (“NFA”).95 
Each FCM has a “designated” SRO, which oversees the FCM’s day-to-day 
regulatory compliance.
96
  
The particular operational requirements that have emerged in the FCM 
context are a product of the nature and function of futures brokerage 
services. Indeed, there are numerous differences between those services 
 
 
 92. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(28) (2012) (defining “futures commission merchant” as one who is 
“engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for” commodity futures and related instruments). The 
assistance of a broker typically is necessary because anyone wishing to transact in futures must be a 
clearing member of the relevant futures exchange and because only individuals registered as “floor 
traders” with the CFTC may actually execute futures trades—requirements that most futures market 
participants do not meet. See In re Griffin Trading Co., 245 B.R. 291, 296 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000), 
vacated on other grounds, 270 B.R. 882 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (additionally noting that “[i]ndividuals who 
want to trade commodities must do so through a ‘broker’ as the broker’s ‘customers’”). 
 93. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27f (2012). 
 94. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–190.10 (2016). 
 95. See CFTC Glossary, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/ 
consumerprotection/educationcenter/cftcglossary/glossary_d (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at 
perma.cc/2UV2-QBBK (noting that the self-regulatory organizations are “the commodity exchanges 
and registered futures associations”). 
 96. See id. (describing the regulatory function of designated self-regulatory organizations). 
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and those provided by securities brokers, the primary one being that, 
whereas a securities customer uses the assets in her account to buy and sell 
securities, the deposits in a futures customer’s account—typically only 
cash—are not used to buy anything.97 Rather, the cash serves as collateral 
(once again, “margin”) for the customer’s futures trades.98 To transact in 
futures, a customer places an order with her FCM for a certain number and 
certain type of futures contracts.
99
 The FCM executes the trade on the 
customer’s behalf by forming a contract with a third party, which may be 
another FCM.
100
 Thereafter, the parties “clear” the transaction, each 
providing the specifics of the transaction to the “clearinghouse” for the 
relevant futures exchange, which then matches the two sides and 
completes the trade.
101
 In connection with completing the trade, the 
clearinghouse requires each FCM to deliver the amount of cash that is 
required as margin for “its” side of the transaction, and each FCM, in turn, 
subtracts the relevant amount from the relevant customer’s brokerage 
account.
102
 If, during the term of the futures contract, fluctuations in 
commodity prices advantage one side of the contract—meaning that that 
party is “in the money” as to the contract—the exchange will require the 
other party’s FCM to deliver additional cash (additional margin, that is) to 
cover the greater amount that the FCM’s customer is likely to owe to the 
advantaged party upon the contract’s termination.103  
Perhaps the most important of the operational requirements governing 
an FCM’s holding of customer assets is section 4d of the CEA, which 
requires that the FCM separately account for all assets deposited by 
customers and prohibits the FCM from commingling customer assets with 
 
 
 97. See Funding a Futures Account, THISMATTER.COM, http://thismatter.com/money/futures/ 
futures-account.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (noting that “[f]utures are not bought and sold” and 
that “the margin required for a futures contract is not like the margin used to purchase stocks” but, 
instead, is intended “to insure contract performance”). 
 98. See In re Griffin Trading Co., 245 B.R. 291, 296 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000), vacated on other 
grounds, 270 B.R. 882 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (observing that margin “is generally some small percentage of 
the total contract price offered as security for contract performance”). 
 99. See id. (referring to the order placement process).  
 100. See id. (describing the trade execution process). 
 101. See id. (“The buying member and the selling member then ‘clear’ the trade by separately 
submitting details of the trade for matching by the exchange ‘clearing house.’”). As described by the 
Griffin court, “‘[c]learing’ is the novation process through which ‘the clearing house . . . becomes the 
buyer to each seller of a futures contract and the seller to each buyer, and assumes responsibility for 
protecting buyers and sellers from financial loss by assuring performance on each contract.’” Id. In the 
event that a customer’s FCM is not a clearing member of the relevant exchange, the FCM must 
execute the transaction through another broker, one that is a clearing member of the exchange. See id.  
 102. See id. (“The broker usually transfers the initial margin from funds which the customer has 
deposited with it for this purpose.”). 
 103. See id. (describing “variation margin calls”). 
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the FCM’s own funds.104 This provision is supported by CFTC rule 1.20, 
which requires the FCM to segregate customer deposits “as belonging to 
[the FCM’s] futures customers.”105 This segregation requirement applies 
on an aggregate basis. That is, for practical reasons, although each 
customer has her own account with its own ledger balance (and the 
customer’s account statements reflect only her account balance as of the 
statement date), the FCM may pool all customer funds into a single 
account with a depository institution, such as a bank or a trust company.
106
 
Accordingly, the segregation requirement obligates the FCM only to 
segregate the pool of customer funds from “house” funds; it does not 
obligate the FCM to segregate each customer’s funds from all other 
customers’ funds.  
Section 4d also prohibits an FCM’s use of a customer’s assets to 
“margin or guarantee the trades or contracts . . . of any customer” other 
than the customer who deposited the assets.
107
 In other words, in 
delivering to a clearinghouse the margin required for a customer’s trade, 
the FCM may not use segregated account funds in excess of the balance of 
that customer’s ledger account. Accordingly, in the event that the margin 
that a clearinghouse requires of a customer exceeds the customer’s account 
balance, the FCM must call upon the defaulting customer to deposit 
additional funds.
108
 The result of an FCM’s failure to heed that 
requirement, and to instead deliver to the clearinghouse funds in excess of 
the balance of the customer’s account, should be obvious: Until the 
customer replenishes her account, the total amount of customer funds on 
deposit with the FCM, having been depleted by the amount of the deficit 
balance, will be insufficient to satisfy the other customers’ legitimate 
claims if they were to simultaneously withdraw their balances—or if the 
firm were to be liquidated.
109
  
 
 
 104. 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(2) (2012) (providing that customer deposits “shall be separately accounted 
for and shall not be commingled with the funds of such commission merchant”). 
 105. 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(a) (2016). 
 106. See id. § 1.20(e)(1) (“A futures commission merchant may for convenience commingle the 
futures customer funds that it receives from, or on behalf of, multiple futures customers in a single 
account or multiple accounts . . . .”). 
 107. 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(2). 
 108. See In re Griffin Trading Co., 245 B.R. 291, 296 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000), vacated on other 
grounds, 270 B.R. 882 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (“If there are not enough funds in [a customer’s] account to 
cover [a] margin call, the broker will require the customer to make an additional deposit.”). 
 109. See id. at 298 (“[O]ne trader’s loss [that “reduces [the customer’s] balance to a negative 
number”] does not change the book balances of other customers, but it does change the amount of 
money actually available in the segregated account to pay those [customers back].”). 
 Pursuant to other operational requirements, which are contained in the CFTC’s rules under the 
CEA, an FCM must, on a daily basis, electronically file with the CFTC and the FCM’s designated 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1232 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1209 
 
 
 
 
Those segregation-related requirements are buttressed by another: 
When depositing customers’ funds in an account with a bank, trust 
company, or other institution, an FCM must clearly identify the account as 
containing customer funds and must obtain an acknowledgement from the 
institution that the funds belong to the FCM’s customers and that the 
institution will promptly reply to any inquiries by CFTC personnel 
regarding customer accounts.
110
 Moreover, the FCM must deposit its own 
funds in the customer segregated account in order to create a buffer that 
helps to ensure the firm’s compliance with segregation requirements and 
may not withdraw more than 25% of those funds without pre-approval by 
a senior official of the FCM and notifying the CFTC and the relevant 
SRO.
111
 A final requirement worth noting is that, if an FCM ceases to 
maintain the requisite amount of capital (net of liabilities) in its house 
accounts, it must halt its operations and transfer customer positions to 
another FCM until it is able to demonstrate compliance.
112
 The objective 
behind the operational requirements, taken together, is to mitigate any risk 
that an FCM might borrow from the segregated account and be unable to 
repay those amounts—a possibility that would inevitably arise if, for 
example, the firm were on the verge of bankruptcy.
113
 
Despite the hands-off policy that the segregation-related operational 
requirements impose, Congress and the CFTC recognized that an FCM’s 
use of customer assets for particular types of trading and investment 
activities could be both beneficial for the FCM and relatively low-risk for 
 
 
SRO the FCM’s calculation of the amount of funds required to be held in segregation and the amount 
actually held in segregation. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.32(c) (2016); see also id. § 1.12(h) (requiring an FCM 
to immediately report to the CFTC and to the FCM’s designated SRO that it has failed to maintain 
sufficient segregated assets). As a result of that requirement, regulators are able to evaluate daily 
whether the FCM maintains sufficient funds in segregation. The notion is that, if the FCM reports a 
deficiency, the CFTC will be able to take action before any losses actually materialize—that is, prior 
to the FCM’s insolvency and liquidation. See Enhancing Protections Afforded Customers and 
Customer Funds Held by Futures Commission Merchants and Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 77 
Fed. Reg. 67,866, 67,889 (proposed Nov. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 22) 
[hereinafter CFTC Amendment Release II] (observing that rule 1.32 will allow CFTC staff “to 
determine almost immediately . . . whether a firm is undersegregated and immediately take steps to 
determine if the firm is experiencing financial difficulty or if customer funds are at risk”). 
 110. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(d), app. A.  
 111. See id. § 1.23(c)–(d). 
 112. See id. § 1.17(a)(4). The institution additionally must grant the CFTC direct, read-only access 
to transaction and balance information for accounts holding customer funds and must agree that the 
CFTC or the relevant designated SRO may examine the accounts at any time. See id. § 1.20(d)(3).  
 113. See CFTC Amendment Release II, supra note 109, at 67,869 (describing recent FCM 
bankruptcies involving deficiencies of customer assets and noting that those events “have 
demonstrated the value of establishing . . . enhanced early warning systems to detect and address 
capital issues”). 
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the FCM’s customers.114 Accordingly, another component of the 
operational requirements applicable to FCMs—CFTC rule 1.25—
authorizes an FCM to invest segregated assets in certain financial 
instruments, including US government securities, municipal securities, 
certificates of deposit issued by an FDIC-insured bank, corporate notes 
and bonds guaranteed by the United States, and interests in money-market 
funds, and to reap the profit from those investments.
115
 Moreover, an FCM 
may buy and sell those instruments pursuant to repurchase or resale 
agreements.
116
 For example, the FCM may, using a repurchase agreement, 
sell (on a short-term basis) customer securities to another financial 
institution, receiving in return cash that permits the FCM to buy permitted 
instruments on a leveraged basis. The CFTC also, however, imposed limits 
on these activities, in terms of, among other things, the amount of 
customer assets that may be invested in permitted instruments and the 
amount that may be invested in any one issuer.
117
 
In light of these rules, an FCM, like a securities broker, may effectively 
use customer assets for its own profit-generating purposes.
118
 Yet, by 
imposing various limitations on that use, the CFTC sought to strike a 
balance between an FCM’s self-focused investment activities and 
protecting customers from any losses arising from them. If investments 
must be conservative and, even then, pursued in moderation, the argument 
goes, then presumably they present no appreciable risks.
119
 
 
 
 114. See Investment of Customer Funds and Funds Held in an Account for Foreign Futures and 
Foreign Options Transactions, 76 Fed. Reg. 78,776, 78,777 (Dec. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 1, 30) [hereinafter CFTC Amendment Release] (noting the “investment flexibility and 
opportunities” associated with an FCM’s ability to invest customer deposits in certain “safe” 
instruments). 
 115. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.25; see also 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(2) (2012) (providing that an FCM may invest 
customer money in certain types of instruments, including those permitted by the CFTC). 
 116. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.25(a)(2). 
 117. See id. § 1.25(b)(3). The FCM must manage any such investments “consistent with the 
objectives of preserving principal and maintaining liquidity” (meaning that the investments must be 
convertible into cash in one business day without a “material loss of value”). Id. § 1.25(b). In addition, 
to the extent an FCM uses repurchase or resale agreements in its rule 1.25-authorized transactions, 
only certain types of institutions may serve as counterparties to those agreements (FDIC-insured banks 
and securities brokers, for example), and the agreements must meet certain requirements relating to, 
among other things, their term, the maintenance of records pertaining to them, and the FCM’s rights in 
the event of its bankruptcy. See id. § 1.25(d). 
 118. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.29 (providing that an FCM may retain interest and income arising from its 
investment of customer assets pursuant to rule 1.25). 
 119. See CFTC Amendment Release, supra note 114, at 78,776 (observing that the CFTC is 
“mindful that customer segregated funds must be invested in a manner that minimizes their exposure 
to credit, liquidity, and market risks . . . to preserve their availability to customers”). 
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Bankruptcy rules comprise the second component of the procedural 
regulation of futures brokers. Specifically, Congress enacted subchapter 
IV of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code
120
 to specify the liquidation 
procedures that apply in FCM insolvencies. Perhaps because it did so at 
the same time that it enacted subchapter III, applicable to securities 
brokers, subchapter IV largely tracks subchapter III.
121
 For purposes of 
achieving procedural regulatory goals, the central provision of subchapter 
IV is section 766, which provides that, in an FCM liquidation, the 
bankruptcy trustee must distribute customer property to customers ratably 
on the basis of the customers’ net equity claims. As in the securities 
brokerage context, those claims have priority over all other claims on the 
estate.
122
  
The key to appreciating the unique protection that subchapter IV 
provides, however, lies in the definition of “customer property” contained 
in section 761(10).
123
 That definition becomes critical if, at the time of an 
FCM’s insolvency, there are insufficient funds in the segregated account 
to satisfy customers’ claims—a circumstance that could arise if, for 
example, the FCM used customer assets for unauthorized purposes or 
otherwise violated the operational requirements detailed above.
124
 Under 
the definition, customer property means, among other things, property 
“received, acquired, or held” by or for the FCM “from or for the account 
of a customer,” including property held for purposes of margining, buying, 
or selling a futures contract, profits arising from the customer’s trades, 
and, as set forth in subsection (A)(ix) of section 761(10), other (non-
segregated) property of the FCM that “any applicable law, rule, or 
regulation requires to be set aside or held for the benefit of a customer.”125 
Following subchapter IV’s enactment, pursuant to authority deemed 
granted
126
 by Congress,
127
 the CFTC adopted “applicable rules” refining 
 
 
 120. 11 U.S.C. §§ 761–767 (2012). 
 121. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (describing the provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code that govern a securities broker’s insolvency). 
 122. See 11 U.S.C. § 766(h) (“[T]he trustee shall distribute customer property ratably to customers 
on the basis and to the extent of such customers’ allowed net equity claims, and in priority to all other 
claims . . . .”). 
 123. See id. § 761(10). 
 124. The FCM bankruptcies discussed in Part III exemplify this possibility. See infra notes 151–
61 and accompanying text (discussing MF Global’s and PFGBest’s bankruptcies).  
 125. 11 U.S.C. § 761(10). 
 126. The use of “deemed” is appropriate here, as it is not certain that the CFTC had authority to 
adopt at least one of the rules that it did. See infra notes 218–40 and accompanying text (describing the 
validity concerns associated with the Recourse Rule). 
 127. See 7 U.S.C. § 24(a) (2012) (providing that the CFTC may specify that “certain cash, 
securities, other property, or commodity contracts are to be included in or excluded from customer 
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the subchapter’s provisions, including rules that expanded the scope of 
section 761(10)’s definition of customer property.128 The CFTC’s “Part 
190” rules, as they are called, go far to protect customers, largely as a 
result of a single provision.
129
 Specifically, much like section 761(10) of 
subchapter IV, the Part 190 rules set forth a list of property that is to be 
considered customer property, and, for the most part, that list mirrors 
section 761(10)’s list.130 The CFTC’s list goes further, however, providing 
in rule 190.08(a)(1)(ii)(J) (the “Recourse Rule”) that customer property 
also includes, critically, general property of the FCM, to the extent that the 
property falling within the other categories on the list is insufficient to 
satisfy in full all customer claims.
131
 In other words, regardless of whether 
any of the property held in the name of the FCM is connected to or derived 
from property that is held or should have been held for the benefit of 
customers, customers are entitled to it if necessary to make them whole. 
Not only is that provision not included in subchapter III, which applies to 
insolvent securities brokers, it likely is also unique among the expansive 
body of bankruptcy laws and rules.
132
  
* * * 
As the discussion above suggests, there are marked similarities 
between some of the procedural regulatory tools used in the futures 
brokerage context and some of the tools used in the securities brokerage 
context. For example, both regimes require that special accounts be 
maintained for the benefit of customers,
133
 and both contain special 
liquidation provisions under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
134
 By the 
same token, there are also marked differences. For example, although both 
securities brokers and futures brokers may use customer assets for 
purposes of generating firm profit, securities brokers may do so only as to 
 
 
property or member property”). 
 128. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 190 (2016). 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. § 190.08(a)(1); see also 11 U.S.C. § 761(10). 
 131. See 17 C.F.R. § 190.08(a)(1)(ii)(J) (providing that “customer property” includes “cash, 
securities or other property of the debtor’s estate . . . , but only to the extent that” the property 
enumerated in rules 190.08(a)(1)(i)(E) and 190.08(a)(i)(ii)(A)-(H) is insufficient). 
 132. See infra Part III.B (discussing the limitations of the Recourse Rule). 
 133. Although the futures industry’s segregation requirement is, at first glance, similar to the 
reserve account requirement to which securities brokers are subject, the requirements differ in various 
respects. Among other things, although futures brokers must calculate the segregated account balance 
on a daily basis, securities brokers may calculate required reserves on a weekly or monthly basis. See 
Sexton Comments, supra note 72, at *2 (describing how customer account maintenance requirements 
in the futures brokerage and securities brokerage contexts differ). 
 134. See supra Part II.A–B (describing specifics of the procedural regulation of securities brokers 
and FCMs, respectively). 
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customers to whom they have extended credit, whereas futures brokers are 
permitted to do so as to all customers.
135
 And, of course, there is the fact 
that securities regulation relies on an insurance regulatory regime as a 
formidable protective tool, whereas futures regulation does not.
136
 These 
differences, and many others, may be attributable to the fact that futures 
are very different from securities and the associated fact that FCMs 
function differently from securities brokers in important respects.
137
 Yet, 
when one considers the substantial weaknesses in the procedural 
regulation of FCMs that the next Part highlights, that rationale becomes 
less convincing.  
III. UNCERTAIN CUSTOMER PROTECTION 
Both the regulation of securities brokers and the regulation of FCMs 
rely on specific tools to achieve the goal of procedural regulation, which, 
again, is to protect assets that customers have deposited with their brokers 
for purposes of carrying out their financial activities. In each of these 
regulatory spheres, the tools employed are generally some mixture of 
operational requirements, bankruptcy rules, and insurance-like 
compensation. Although the preceding discussion describes the particular 
combination of tools on which each sphere relies, it does not provide a 
normative assessment of them.  
 
 
 135. See supra notes 60–65, 114–17 and accompanying text (describing regulations permitting 
securities and futures brokers to invest customer assets for the brokers’ own benefit). 
 136. In 1974, Congress instructed the CFTC to conduct a study addressing whether there was a 
need for insurance in the FCM context, and, in 1976—two years before Congress enacted subchapter 
IV of the Bankruptcy Code—the agency rendered its report, which concluded that insurance was not 
necessary. See MARKHAM, supra note 10, at 87 (discussing the CFTC’s conclusion that “there was no 
need for legislative action” as to insurance for futures customers). The report noted, among other 
things, that futures customer losses in connection with FCM bankruptcies from 1938 through 1974 
were, overall, lower than losses arising in connection with securities broker bankruptcies and that there 
was adequate public confidence in FCMs’ protection of customer deposits. See id. (listing the bases for 
the CFTC’s conclusion that insurance protection for futures customers was unnecessary). Accordingly, 
concluded the report, the benefits of an insurance program were insufficient to warrant the associated 
costs. See id. (observing that, according to the CFTC, “the cost-benefit ratios demonstrated that 
insurance protection was not cost effective”). Soon after the issuance of the report, two FCM 
bankruptcies arising from customer defaults resulted in substantial customer losses. See id. at 87–89 
(describing the two bankruptcies and resulting customer losses). Nonetheless, the CFTC—or, more 
precisely, its Division of Trading and Markets—maintained that, despite the risks posed by customer 
defaults, existing regulations generally provided sufficient protections against default-related losses. 
See id. at 89 (noting the CFTC’s position that “existing regulatory safeguards . . . operate[d] to 
mitigate the effect of [one FCM failure] on customers and the exchange itself”). 
 137. See supra notes 9–10, 98–103 and accompanying text (describing what a futures contract is 
and what FCMs do); see also Sexton Comments, supra note 72, at *2 (“The segregation requirement 
was developed to meet the particular needs and characteristics of the futures industry . . . .”). 
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That is the task of this Part. It focuses primarily on the regulatory 
regime governing FCMs, which has received little attention from scholars 
to date, particularly in comparison to the widespread and extensive focus 
that securities brokers have received.
138
 Critical analysis of FCM 
regulation is especially important now, moreover, given the ever-growing 
number of retail investors deploying their assets in the futures markets.
139
 
Part III.A focuses on the operational requirements governing FCMs, 
elucidating how, even after having been substantially overhauled in recent 
years, they harbor weaknesses that present substantial risks to customers, 
while Part III.B analyzes the deficiencies of the seemingly protective 
futures-specific bankruptcy rules. 
A. Operational Requirements 
As Part II details, various statutes and CFTC rules that apply to FCMs 
govern the manner in which FCMs conduct their businesses.
140
 
Collectively, these provisions aim to ensure the safety of customer 
deposits by, among other things, specifying where and how the deposits 
must be maintained and prohibiting the use of other customers’ deposited 
funds to support a defaulting customer’s transactions.141 Operational 
requirements of some variety are, moreover, necessary, especially 
considering two recent FCM bankruptcies that produced substantial 
anguish and losses for FCM customers.
142
 After briefly describing these 
calamitous episodes and summarizing the regulatory reform that they 
spawned,
143
 this Subpart explains why, without more, the requirements 
presently governing FCMs still are not up to the task of protecting 
customer assets.
144
 
 
 
 138. As an imprecise example, a Westlaw search in late 2014 showed that over 5000 law journal 
articles in Westlaw’s “Law Reviews & Journals” database used the term “securities broker” or 
“broker-dealer,” while fewer than 400 used the term “futures commission merchant” or “futures 
broker.” 
 139. See Andrew Greene, Managed Futures Reach Retail Portfolios, FIN. TIMES (June 9, 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d0f8c1be-aef1-11e1-a4e0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3L9aWXsrj (“Managed 
futures, which a few short years ago were available only in hedge fund and institutional products, are 
increasingly finding their way into retail investors’ portfolios.”).  
 140. See supra notes 104–19 and accompanying text (describing operational requirements in the 
futures brokerage context). 
 141. See supra notes 104–19 and accompanying text. 
 142. See infra notes 151–61 and accompanying text. 
 143. See infra notes 172–80 and accompanying text (describing regulatory changes made in the 
bankruptcies’ aftermath). 
 144. See infra notes 181–205 and accompanying text. 
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1. Regulatory Failures and Responses 
As Part II observes, the most important operational requirement 
governing FCMs requires an FCM to segregate customer assets from the 
FCM’s own assets and to continuously maintain a specified amount of net 
capital in its own accounts, thereby helping to ensure its financial 
health.
145
 Of course, as Part II also notes, amidst the operational duties that 
apply to FCMs is an operational right: An FCM may invest its customers’ 
assets in certain types of financial instruments for its own benefit, 
retaining any profits arising from those investments.
146
 The operational 
requirements constrain this activity, too, however. There are only a limited 
number of instruments in which FCMs are permitted to invest customer 
assets, and investments in those instruments are subject to fairly stringent 
requirements and limitations.
147
  
In evaluating these operational requirements, it is important to keep in 
mind that, even though FCMs traditionally have been permitted to use 
customer assets for generating investment-related profit, the futures 
brokerage business model nonetheless has differed substantially from its 
securities brokerage counterpart. In the securities arena, firms’ business 
structures contemplate brokers’ lending funds and securities to customers 
and their use of the collateral associated with those loans both for 
providing services to other customers—namely, lending securities to other 
customers to facilitate their short sales—and for proprietary investing and 
trading.
148
 Perhaps because securities brokers hold the customer assets that 
they use in these ways as collateral, the brokers are permitted not only to 
use the assets somewhat less conservatively than what is permitted by 
CFTC rule 1.25 for FCMs, but also to repledge them in connection with 
their own borrowing activities.
149
 Accordingly, FCMs’ activities 
historically have not been viewed as creating the same risk for customer 
assets as the activities that securities brokers pursue.
150
 Particularly given 
 
 
 145. See supra notes 104–06, 112 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Alarna Carlsson-Sweeny, Trends in Prime Brokerage, PRAC. L. CO. (Apr. 1, 2010), 
http://us.practicallaw.com/7-501-8652?q=%22trends+in+prime+brokerage%22 (noting that brokerage 
firms have the ability “to rehypothecate (or re-pledge) the assets that clients post as margin or 
collateral for trades,” allowing a firm to “use the client’s assets, for example, to lend to . . . hedge 
funds or post as collateral itself for another purpose”). 
 150. Cf. MARKHAM, supra note 10, at 87 (listing the reasons behind the CFTC’s conclusion that 
insurance coverage of futures accounts was not warranted, including that losses arising from FCM 
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this difference, the operational requirements applicable to FCMs may 
seem sufficient for protecting customer assets, if not overly precautionary. 
Certainly one might have surmised as much prior to October 31, 2011. 
On that day, the large FCM (and registered securities broker) MF Global, 
Inc. was placed in liquidation when its parent company, MF Global 
Holdings, Ltd., declared bankruptcy.
151
 The bankruptcy was later 
determined to have had a number of causes, all of which could generally 
be distilled to one factor: the firm’s pursuit of high-risk investment 
activities, centering on European sovereign debt (in the form of bonds).
152
 
Although MF Global’s management believed these instruments to be 
virtually risk-free,
153
 they proved to be virtually the opposite.
154
 Putting 
aside for the moment the cause of the bankruptcy, however, the most 
notable aspect of the event, and certainly the most disturbing for MF 
 
 
insolvencies had not been as high as losses in contexts, such as securities brokerage, in which 
insurance existed). 
 151. See Michael J. de la Merced & Ben Protess, MF Global Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2011, 10:21 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/mf-global-files-
for-bankruptcy/?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/2EAF-5Q7V (reporting on MF Global’s 
bankruptcy filing). MF Global, Inc. was only the firm’s US brokerage subsidiary; to perform 
brokerage functions outside of the United States, the firm had established additional MF Global 
subsidiaries in other countries, at least some of which were also placed in liquidation. See STAFF 
REPORT PREPARED FOR REP. RANDY NEUGEBAUER, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & 
INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON FIN. SERVS. 22 (2012), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/ 
uploadedfiles/256882456288524.pdf [hereinafter STAFF REPORT] (listing MF Global Holdings’s 
regulated subsidiaries and the regulation governing each such subsidiary); Kyri Evagora et al., MF 
Global Enters Insolvency Proceedings on Both Sides of the Pond, REED SMITH (Nov. 1, 2011), 
http://m.reedsmith.com/mf-global-enters-insolvency-proceedings-on-both-sides-of-the-pond-11-01-
2011/ (observing that SIPC “initiated the liquidation of MF Global, Inc.” under SIPA and that “the UK 
subsidiary, MF Global UK Limited, was placed into a new special administration regime for 
investment banks”). Because each of the subsidiaries was wholly owned and controlled by the the 
parent company, see Disclosure Statement for the Plan of Liquidation for MF Global Holdings Ltd., 
MF Global Finance USA Inc., and Their Debtor Affiliates at 90, In re MF Global Holdings Ltd., 481 
B.R. 268 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-15059 (MG)) (depicting the MF Global entities and their 
relationship to one another), this Article uses “MF Global” to refer to the parent company or the 
brokerage subsidiaries, as appropriate. 
 152. Matthew Leising, MF Global’s $310 Million Margin Call Exceeded Its Market Value, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2012, 6:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-06/mf-global-faced-
a-310-million-margin-call-on-futures-broker-s-final-day.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9KZH-
WKZ9 (describing how MF Global’s “$6.3 billion European debt trade,” among other things, 
precipitated MF Global’s bankruptcy).  
 153. See John Carney, The Trade That Killed MF Global, CNBC (Nov. 2, 2011, 12:02 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/45132384, archived at http://perma.cc/X9SX-4WXE (reporting that, in 
pursuing its “European debt trade,” MF Global was “taking what it viewed as a nearly risk-free 
trade”). 
 154. See Report of Investigation of Louis J. Freeh, Chapter 11 Trustee of MF Global Holdings 
Ltd. et al. at 97, In re MF Global Holdings Ltd., No. 11-15059 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013), 
available at http://www.mfglobalcaseinfo.com/pdflib/1279_15059.pdf (observing that MF Global’s 
bet on European sovereign debt “exposed [the firm] to an excessive level of risk”). 
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Global’s customers, was that, at the point of bankruptcy, the firm’s 
segregated accounts contained insufficient funds to cover customers’ 
legitimate claims.
155
 The shortfall, which totaled approximately $1.6 
billion,
156
 or approximately 27% of customer deposits,
157
 was the product 
of the firm’s inappropriate use of customer funds to meet its ever growing 
liquidity needs as it neared insolvency.
158
  
A mere nine months after MF Global’s bankruptcy, another FCM, 
PFGBest, went bankrupt—an event that similarly revealed a mammoth 
deficiency of customer assets.
159
 Although PFGBest’s customer assets 
were but a fraction of those held by MF Global, PFGBest’s bankruptcy 
was substantially larger in scale than MF Global’s, in terms of the 
percentage of customer assets that were missing from the segregated 
account.
160
 In addition, the cause of PFGBest’s shortfall was arguably 
more troublesome than the inept managerial decisions that stood at the 
heart of MF Global’s downfall. PFGBest’s founder had, quite simply, 
stolen customers’ funds, draining the segregated account beginning in the 
early 1990s and fabricating the quarterly account statements required by 
the NFA, as PFGBest’s designated SRO.161  
The effects of these dual bankruptcies were far-reaching. Futures 
traders and other market participants left the market (at least temporarily), 
 
 
 155.  See STAFF REPORT, supra note 151, at 1 (observing that MF Global’s demise produced a 
substantial deficiency of customer funds). 
 156. See id. 
 157. This conclusion arises from the fact that, in the estimates of the bankruptcy trustee, 
“customers held up to $5.9 billion altogether.” Hilary Russ, MF Global Trustee Reveals Suspicious 
Transfers, LAW360 (Dec. 9, 2011, 4:11 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/292134/mf-global-
trustee-reveals-suspicious-transfers, archived at http://perma.cc/LY5L-6L2T. 
 158. See Jason M. Breslow, MF Global Trustee Hints at Negligence Suit Against Jon Corzine, 
PBS (June 4, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/mf-
global-six-billion-dollar-bet/mf-global-trustee-hints-at-negligece-suit-against-jon-corzine/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/W3GL-ZYS9 (reporting the conclusion of MF Global’s trustee that the firm had used 
customer funds to cover “margin calls on European sovereign debt positions”). 
 159. See Jerry A. Dicolo et al., Q&A: What PFGBest Customers Can Expect, WALL ST. J. (July 
11, 2012, 6:23 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230364400457752112224650 
5822, archived at http://perma.cc/R2PY-687B (noting that PFGBest filed for bankruptcy under chapter 
7 of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 160. See Peter Lattman, Futures Executive Is Arrested After Admitting Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (July 
13, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/futures-executive-confesses-to-stealing-
millions-from-customers/, archived at https://perma.cc/R2F8-H83D (reporting that although 
PFGBest’s “supposed bank statement with U.S. Bank said [the firm] had $221 million in customer 
funds,” the account actually contained only $6.3 million). 
 161. See id. (describing details of the fraud carried out by PFGBest’s founder); see also Karen 
Gullo & Edvard Pettersson, Peregrine’s Wasendorf Gets 50 Years for Theft of Millions, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 31, 2013, 12:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-31/u-s-wants-peregrine-
s-wasendorf-imprisoned-for-50-years (referring to PFGBest’s founder’s “20-year embezzlement 
starting in the early 1990s”). 
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simultaneously reducing market liquidity;
162
 firms known as commodity 
trading advisors, who traded in futures on behalf of their advisory clients, 
closed their businesses;
163
 and farmers who relied on futures trading to 
hedge against fluctuations in grain prices had insufficient capital to pursue 
their business activities as a result of having lost the funds they had used 
to margin their trades.
164
 Many affected parties and horrified onlookers 
blamed the CFTC, as well as the CME and the NFA, which had been, 
respectively, MF Global’s and, as noted, PFGBest’s designated SROs, 
primarily for having adopted overly lax rules governing FCMs’ use of 
customer funds.
165
 
On that score, there was, in fact, substantial room for improvement. 
Rule 1.25 at the time permitted FCMs to invest customer assets in a wider 
range of instruments than what is permitted now, including corporate notes 
and bonds other than those guaranteed by the US government and interests 
in sovereign debt
166—the securities that felled MF Global and that are 
known to “carr[y] enormous default and liquidity risks.”167 In addition, 
FCMs that were also regulated securities brokers could engage in “in-
 
 
 162. Cf. Nick Santiago, 5 Reasons Why Volume Has Died, INTHEMONEYSTOCKS.COM (May 14, 
2012, 3:53 PM), https://www.inthemoneystocks.com/free-services/rant-rave-blog/item/21921-5-Reasons-
Why-Volume-Has-Died, archived at https://perma.cc/8ZCQ-SVKP (observing that one reason why 
“trading volume has been extremely light since . . . March 2009” is that MF Global’s bankruptcy 
caused traders to “los[e] faith in the entire financial system”); Jeffrey Carter, Fraud Is Killing Retail 
Futures Business, POINTS & FIGURES (July 13, 2012), http://pointsandfigures.com/2012/07/13/fraud-
is-killing-retail-futures-business/ (stating that, during the years since the MF Global and PFGBest 
bankruptcies, “we have sensed that the [futures] business was contracting,” that “[f]ewer players are 
doing more volume,” and that “[t]he breadth of that volume is now concentrated into fewer and fewer 
hands”). 
 163. See Daniel P. Collins, New York Times Once Again Gets It Wrong, FUTURES (Jan. 19, 2014), 
http://www.futuresmag.com/2014/01/19/new-york-times-once-again-gets-it-wrong, archived at https:// 
perma.cc/EJ8P-6HXH (discussing “commodity trading advisors that shut down” in the aftermath of 
MF Global’s bankruptcy). 
 164. See id. (referencing “farmers and ranchers out millions unable to buy seed or restock herds 
due to their money being gone” as a result of MF Global’s bankruptcy).  
 165. See, e.g., Bob Burgdorfer & Philip Shishkin, Insight: Farm Belt Rage over MF Global Could 
Chill Markets, REUTERS (Nov. 22, 2011, 2:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/22/us-
mfglobal-futures-idUSTRE7AL06I20111122, archived at https://perma.cc/BW77-A485 (“Traders are 
livid over both MF Global’s collapse and what they perceive as the CME Group’s failure to act 
quickly or boldly enough to restore order to the market . . . .”); Mike Obel, PFG Collapses in MF 
Global-Like Debacle; Broker Rues Lack of Caution, Oversight, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 11, 2012, 7:44 
AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/pfg-collapses-mf-global-debacle-broker-rues-lack-caution-oversight-
722119, archived at https://perma.cc/AN7U-ATJ2 (describing customers’ and financial professionals’ 
scorn for federal regulators after MF Global’s and PFGBest’s bankruptcies). 
 166. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.25(a)(1)(vi), (vii) (2007). 
 167. Press Release, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Subcommittee Investigation Reveals Decisions by 
Corzine Led to MF Global Bankruptcy and Missing Customer Funds (Nov. 14, 2012), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=311647, archived at 
https://perma.cc/AT5W-XUXY. 
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house” repurchase transactions, exchanging customer assets for permitted 
investments that they held in their capacities as securities brokers.
168
 
Finally, FCMs whose customers traded in non-US futures markets were 
not obligated to segregate all of those customers’ deposits from their own 
assets.
169
 Instead, if the firms chose to use the “alternative method” of 
segregation for foreign futures trading contained in CFTC rule 30.7, they 
were required to segregate only the portion of those assets that might be 
needed to margin the relevant customers’ open trades.170 Any excess 
amounts that the customers had deposited could be freely commingled 
with the firm’s own assets.171 
In late 2011, shortly after MF Global’s bankruptcy, the CFTC 
eliminated several of the permitted investments for customer assets 
contained in rule 1.25.
172
 As Part II points out, customer funds and 
securities now may be used only for certain types of “safe” investments, 
including US government bonds and securities, municipal securities, and 
bonds issued by US government corporations.
173
 The agency also 
eliminated the ability of dually-registered FCMs to enter into in-house 
repurchase transactions using customer assets,
174
 as well as the alternative 
method of segregating customer assets set forth in rule 30.7.
175
  
 
 
 168. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 1.25(a)(3)(i) (2007) (authorizing a dually-registered FCM to exchange 
customer money for “securities that are permitted investments and are held by the [FCM] in 
connection with its securities broker . . . activities”). The CFTC has articulated the risks that these 
transactions present: 
[I]n an in-house transaction, cash and securities are under common control of the same legal 
entity, which presents the potential for conflicts of interest in the handling of customer funds 
that may be tested in times of crisis. Unlike a [third-party] repurchase or reverse repurchase 
agreement, there is no mechanism to ensure that an in-house transaction is done on a delivery 
versus payment basis. Furthermore, an in-house transaction, by its nature, is transacted within 
a single entity and therefore cannot be legally documented, since an entity cannot contract 
with itself . . . . 
CFTC Amendment Release, supra note 114, at 78,783. 
 169. See CFTC Amendment Release II, supra note 109, at 67,895 (describing the “alternative 
method” of segregating customer assets). 
 170. See id. at 67,867 (observing that rule 30.7 “requires an FCM to maintain in separate accounts 
an amount of funds only sufficient to cover the margin required on open foreign futures contracts, plus 
or minus any unrealized gains or losses”). 
 171. Cf. id. (noting that, pursuant to rule 30.7, an FCM “is not required to maintain a sufficient 
amount of funds in [the] separate accounts to pay the full account balances of all of its foreign futures 
. . . customers at all times”). 
 172. See CFTC Amendment Release, supra note 114, at 78,778 (announcing the adoption of the 
amendments to rule 1.25). 
 173. See supra notes 114–19 and accompanying text. 
 174. See CFTC Amendment Release, supra note 114, at 78,782–83 (eliminating rule 1.25(a)(3), 
thereby prohibiting “exchange[s] of cash or permitted instruments, held by a dually registered 
FCM/broker dealer, for customer funds”). 
 175. See Enhancing Protections Afforded Customers and Customer Funds Held by Futures 
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Beyond amending existing rules, the CFTC adopted a number of new 
ones, many of which center on providing information to regulators and 
customers.
176
 These new rules require that FCMs inform regulators if their 
financial health falters
177
 and provide customers with extensive disclosures 
about the risks associated with holding a futures brokerage account.
178
 
Another new rule requires FCMs to establish risk management programs 
targeted at managing risks relating to customer funds.
179
 Regardless of 
their specific content, however, all of the new rules were intended to 
fortify the procedural regulation of FCMs in order to forestall another 
fiasco like those wrought by MF Global and PFGBest.
180
 
2. Ongoing Deficiencies 
By themselves, however, these operational rules are not enough. 
Regardless how limited the range of uses of customer funds or how 
extensive FCMs’ reporting and disclosure requirements may be, FCMs 
may nonetheless fail to act accordingly. Case in point is MF Global. To be 
sure, FCM regulation at the time of the firm’s bankruptcy would have 
permitted MF Global’s use of customer assets to invest in the 
 
 
Commission Merchants and Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,506, 68,573 (Nov. 
13, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 22, 30, 140) (adopting an amendment to section 30.7 to 
eliminate the alternative method). 
 176. See generally id. (describing the rationale for the amendments and new rules and formally 
adopting them). 
 177. Among other things, an FCM must notify its designated SRO and the CFTC of its failure to 
maintain the required amount of net capital, see 17 C.F.R. § 1.12(a) (2016), its having experienced a 
material change in its ability to pay its financial obligations, see id. § 1.12(k), and certain material 
changes to its operations that could adversely affect its available cash and other resources. See id. 
§ 1.12(l). 
 178. The risk disclosure statement must include notices to the effect that customer assets are not 
protected by insurance and that the FCM may commingle a customer’s assets with those deposited by 
other customers (thereby creating risk arising from the activities of other customers), deposit customer 
assets with its affiliates, and invest customer assets in certain types of investments, as permitted by the 
CFTC. See id. § 1.55(b). 
 179. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.11(a), (e) (requiring FCMs to adopt risk management programs and setting 
forth the necessary elements of those programs). 
 180. See Laura Goldsmith, III. The Collapse of MF Global and Peregrine Financial Group: The 
Response from the Futures Industry, Regulators, and Customers, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 25, 30 
(2012) (observing in connection with the CFTC’s amendments to rule 1.25, “[a]lthough Rule 1.25 
exemptions may not have caused MF Global’s collapse, the CFTC reacted swiftly to fortify its 
regulations in order to protect customer funds and avert a repeat crisis”); CFTC Amendment Release 
II, supra note 109, at 67,869 (describing the rule changes discussed in the text accompanying notes 
175–79, supra, and noting that the MF Global and PFGBest insolvencies “highlighted weaknesses in 
the customer protection regime prescribed in the [CFTC’s] regulations”). 
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instruments—European sovereign bonds181—that proved so devastating to 
the firm.
182
 However, the rules did not permit MF Global to use customer 
funds to satisfy its margin payment obligations to its counterparties,
183
 nor 
did they permit the firm to invest customer assets in instruments that the 
CFTC had not expressly authorized
184
 or to commingle customer funds 
with its own funds,
185
 which the firm is also alleged to have done.
186
  
Of course, one obvious objection to the prospect that an FCM may 
flout applicable rules is that “flouting” is a possibility in every financial 
services regulatory context, from investment adviser regulation, to 
securities broker regulation, to banking regulation and beyond. But here is 
the difference: While FCM regulation relies heavily on operational 
requirements to achieve the procedural regulatory goal of protecting 
customers’ assets, the regulation of other types of financial services is not 
so limited. SIPA-based insurance coverage exists in the securities 
brokerage context,
187
 and there is FDIC insurance in the banking 
context.
188
 Moreover, in other financial services realms, such as financial 
planning and mutual fund marketing, providing services does not require 
the service provider to take custody of customer assets, thereby alleviating 
any need for protections more robust than operational requirements.
189
  
There are exceptions to this general state of affairs, as one might 
expect. For example, there is no insurance regime or special bankruptcy 
 
 
 181. See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text. Although rule 1.25 permitted FCMs to 
invest customer assets in bonds issued by other sovereignties, the firm predominantly used its own 
assets for those investments. See Breslow, supra note 158. However, it later used customer assets to 
cover margin calls when the value of the investments declined precipitously. See id. 
 182. See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text (describing the events leading to MF 
Global’s bankruptcy). 
 183. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.23(b) (2016) (providing that an FCM’s withdrawal of funds from its 
segregated customer account may not result “in the funds of one futures customer being used to 
purchase, margin or carry the trades, contracts or commodity options, or extend the credit of any . . . 
other person”). 
 184. See CFTC Complaint, supra note 45, at 10 (“An FCM may invest customer segregated funds 
only if the investment is on the applicable CFTC Regulation’s list of ‘permitted investments.’”). 
 185. See 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(2), (b) (2012) (prohibiting the commingling of futures customer assets 
with the FCM’s own assets); see also supra notes 104–06 (describing the segregation requirement to 
which FCMs are subject). 
 186. See CFTC Complaint, supra note 45, at 37–40 (charging MF Global and certain of its 
officers with violations of the CEA and various CFTC rules). 
 187. See supra notes 78–91 and accompanying text (describing SIPA insurance protection). 
 188. See Understanding Deposit Insurance, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/ 
deposit/deposits/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/L7KA-KK2H. 
 189. This is evident, for example, from the fact that the SEC’s “custody rule” under the federal 
statute governing investment advisers, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), 15 
U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2012), provides that it is a fraudulent act for an investment adviser to have 
custody of customer assets unless it complies with a number of detailed requirements. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.206(4)-2(a) (2016). 
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rules in the investment advisory context, despite the fact that at least some 
investment advisers, including many hedge fund managers and most 
private equity fund managers, are deemed to have “custody” of (control 
over and access to) investor assets,
190
 as are many commodity trading 
advisors.
191
 Once more, however, there is an important distinction to be 
made between the regulation of these financial services and the regulation 
of futures brokerage services. Only in the latter realm may the service 
provider use its customers’ assets for its own purposes. Investment 
advisers are not permitted to do so; rather, an investment adviser’s 
interaction with assets over which the adviser has custody is generally 
limited to the investment of those assets on the relevant clients’ behalf, for 
the clients’ benefit.192 Analogous limitations apply to the activities of 
commodity trading advisors.
193
 
To be sure, it may not be obvious why the distinction between having 
the ability to use customer assets and not having that ability is meaningful. 
The answer lies in the ways in which financial services providers’ 
incentives may differ when dealing in customer assets for their own 
benefit, as compared with dealing in customer assets for the benefit of 
customers. When a financial services provider uses customer assets for its 
own purposes, the firm may have a greater incentive than it otherwise 
would to go beyond the letter of the law to achieve a greater return for the 
firm—that is, a greater benefit from the use of customer assets. Once 
again, MF Global is instructive. As noted, among that firm’s numerous 
 
 
 190. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(d)(2)(iii) (providing that “[c]ustody includes . . . [a]ny 
capacity (such as general partner of a limited partnership, managing member of a limited liability 
company or a comparable position for another type of pooled investment vehicle, or trustee of a trust) 
that gives you or your supervised person legal ownership of or access to client funds or securities”). 
 191. That many commodity trading advisors are deemed to have custody of customer assets is a 
product of the fact that they are also commodity pool operators that, therefore, act as general partner of 
a commodity pool. See infra notes 308–09 and accompanying text (describing the function of 
commodity pool operators). 
 192. Although the Advisers Act does not expressly state as much, this conclusion is implied by the 
fact that the statute does not permit advisers to engage in any other activities with client assets and that 
advisers are deemed fiduciaries to their clients. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 
375 U.S. 180, 190–91 (1963) (observing that the relationship of investment advisers to their clients is 
one of “trust and confidence” and that an investment adviser may not carry out its services so as to 
“operate against the interests of clients and the public”). 
 193. No provision of the laws and rules governing commodity trading advisors permits them to 
invest customer assets for their own benefit. In addition, like investment advisers, commodity trading 
advisors may be deemed fiduciaries under common law. See DIV. OF SWAP DEALER & INTERMEDIARY 
OVERSIGHT, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CFTC ADVISORY NO. 13-79, STAFF 
ADVISORY CONCERNING COMMODITY TRADING ADVISORS AND SWAPS 12 (2013), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/13-79.pdf (noting that 
commodity trading advisors could be deemed fiduciaries and, additionally, are subject to antifraud 
provisions under the CEA). 
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regulatory transgressions was its investment of segregated account assets 
in instruments other than those that were expressly permitted by rule 
1.25.
194
 If corporate bonds are deemed safe from a regulatory perspective, 
why not other instruments with similar risk/reward profiles? For that 
matter, why not other instruments with slightly more risk but also greater 
possible rewards? And although CFTC rules require an FCM to reimburse 
the segregated account for any losses arising from the FCM’s investment 
of customer funds,
195
 that requirement is of little help as the firm 
approaches the precipice of bankruptcy. 
Indeed, the incentives that accompany conflicts of interest inform 
various regulations governing substantive activities that, though largely for 
the benefit of the relevant customer, nevertheless contain an element of 
benefitting the firm. For example, an investment adviser may charge a 
client a performance-based fee, which is a fee that is a certain percentage 
of the profits that the adviser achieves for the client.
196
 Because, however, 
such a fee is deemed to create a conflict of interest—that is, the adviser 
may have an incentive to effect too many or the wrong kind of transactions 
for the client in hopes of generating a greater performance fee
197—the 
rules applicable to investment advisers specify that no client may be 
subject to a performance fee unless her net worth exceeds a certain 
threshold.
198
 By contrast, the rules implicitly recognize that, when services 
are purely service-providing in nature and involve no additional benefit to 
the service provider, the service provider arguably has fewer incentives to 
push the boundaries because it is not afflicted with a similar conflict of 
interest.
199
 
 
 
 194. See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text. 
 195. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.29(b) (2016) (“The [FCM] . . . shall bear sole responsibility for any losses 
resulting from the investment of customer funds in instruments described in § 1.25.”). 
 196. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (permitting investment advisers to charge performance-based fees 
under certain circumstances). 
 197.  See, e.g., Amerivest Inv. Mgmt., LLC, SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 19, 2014), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2014/amerivest-081914-205a1.htm, archived at 
https://perma.cc/RRK4-UYWU (internal quotation marks omitted) (observing that performance-based 
compensation may “encourage advisers to take undue risks with the funds of clients, to speculate, or to 
overtrade”). 
 198. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a) (providing that only clients that meet certain net-worth 
thresholds may be charged performance-based fees). 
 199. In the context of adviser compensation, this conclusion is implied by the fact that asset-based 
fee arrangements, under which an adviser is paid a particular percentage of the assets it manages, are 
not subject to the regulatory strictures that apply to performance-based compensation arrangements, 
other than the requirement that the fees not be excessive. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 
U.S. 335, 346 (2010) (observing that, under the Investment Company Act of 1940, an investment 
adviser cannot “charge a[n asset-based] fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no 
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The effects of conflicts of interest may be discerned also in the many 
recent examples of under-segregation—instances in which regulators have 
penalized an FCM for maintaining insufficient assets in its segregated 
account.
200
 The amount that an FCM must maintain in segregation is a 
precise number and can be calculated at any given time.
201
 Accordingly, it 
would seem a relatively straightforward matter for the FCM always to 
ensure that the requisite amount of assets remains segregated. That picture 
is complicated, however, by FCMs’ awareness that not all uses of 
customer funds are off limits. If the assets can be used to generate income 
or profit for the FCM through the activities that rule 1.25 permits,
202
 then 
they can be used. Period. To be sure, customer assets cannot be used for 
many purposes,
203
 but at the point at which at least some uses become 
possible, conflicts of interests become more prominent. When that 
happens, the line between types of uses of customer assets cannot be as 
clear and certain as would be the line between some uses, on one hand, and 
none at all, on the other—regardless of the content of any particular rules 
or requirements.  
Ultimately, the conflict of interest that arises when a firm is allowed to 
use customer assets for its own benefit is the reason why operational 
requirements are not enough. This insight is reflected in SIPA
204—
securities brokers may engage in activities using customer assets that are, 
quite simply, too risky. Of course, FCM regulation involves more than 
operational requirements, in that operational protections are reinforced by 
special, customer-oriented rules of the Bankruptcy Code.
205
 As the next 
 
 
reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arms length 
bargaining”).  
 Of course, even in contexts in which a service provider may not, under applicable laws and rules, 
use customer assets to benefit itself, the service provider may nonetheless engage in arguably worse 
behavior, such as by expropriating customer or client assets or by carrying out a Ponzi scheme with 
them. See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein, Credit Crunch Unmasks Madoff, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2008, 
11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2008-12-11/credit-crunch-unmasks-madoff 
(reporting the discovery of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, through which Madoff defrauded his 
advisory clients of multiple billions of dollars). 
 200. See U.S. FCM Violations: Customer Segregated and Secured, Minimum Capital Violations, 
NEEDHAM CONSULTING, http://needhamconsulting.net/2013/09/27/u-s-customer-segregated-funds-
violations/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/BF3C-VFE8 (listing FCMs 
against whom the CFTC has brought enforcement actions for violating the CFTC’s segregation 
requirements). 
 201. See supra note 109 (describing CFTC rules requiring FCMs’ daily reporting of both the 
amount of funds required to be segregated and the amount actually segregated). 
 202. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text (describing activities that rule 1.25 permits). 
 203. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.  
 204. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text (summarizing SIPA’s purpose). 
 205. See supra Part II.B. 
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Subpart describes, however, those rules also cannot be counted on to 
remedy a shortfall in customer assets that may exist at the time of an 
FCM’s bankruptcy. 
B. Bankruptcy Rules 
As Part II discusses, special bankruptcy rules govern the liquidation of 
FCMs. In particular, subchapter IV of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code 
sets forth the liquidation framework, and Congress authorized the CFTC to 
adopt rules building out that framework, such as rules including certain 
types of cash, securities, or other assets within the definition of customer 
property or excluding certain types of assets from the definition.
206
 
Pursuant to that grant of authority, the CFTC adopted the Part 190 rules, 
which contain the Recourse Rule, among others.
207
 Under the Recourse 
Rule, recall, assets of the FCM’s general estate may be deemed customer 
property if there is insufficient property in the estate otherwise constituting 
customer property.
208
 As a result of that provision, in the event that, in 
connection with an FCM’s liquidation under subchapter IV, there would 
otherwise be a shortfall of customer property, customers have a first 
priority claim to the estate’s assets, ahead of the firm’s unsecured 
creditors.
209
  
The Part 190 rules may seem to go far in offsetting the fact that the 
operational requirements governing FCMs are not failsafe mechanisms for 
protecting customers. Such a conclusion would be mistaken, however, as a 
result of three factors: (1) the rules may be inapplicable, (2) if they do 
apply, they may be held invalid; and (3) if they both apply and are held 
valid, they may be irrelevant. The remainder of this Subpart discusses each 
of these factors in turn. 
1. Inapplicability 
Although, in the early era of FCM regulation, most FCMs likely were 
single-purpose businesses, today many FCMs perform other types of 
services in the financial markets, including, above all, securities brokerage 
 
 
 206. See 7 U.S.C. § 24(a) (2012) (providing that authorization); see also supra notes 120–25 and 
accompanying text (generally summarizing subchapter IV). 
 207. See supra notes 126–31 and accompanying text (describing the Part 190 rules). 
 208. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text. 
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services.
210
 That is, these firms act both as securities brokers for customers 
wishing to trade in securities and as FCMs for customers wishing to 
transact in futures. In light of their dual role, they are dual-registrants, 
registered concurrently with the CFTC as FCMs and with the SEC as 
broker-dealers and subject to regulation and oversight by both agencies.
211
 
The fact of dual registration, though perhaps efficient for a dually-
registered firm’s customers, is problematic for those customers when the 
firm undergoes liquidation as a result of bankruptcy.  
The SIPA-created insurance regime that applies to securities brokers 
provides that, in the event the SEC calls upon SIPC to administer the 
liquidation of a bankrupt securities broker’s estate, the bankruptcy 
provisions of chapter 7 are to be stayed.
212
 In that event, not only would 
the bankruptcy provisions governing securities brokers, set forth in 
subchapter III of Chapter 7, be stayed, but the bankruptcy provisions 
governing futures brokers, set forth in subchapter IV of Chapter 7, may 
also be stayed.
213
 As a result, the estate of an insolvent FCM that is also a 
securities broker might be entirely administered under SIPA, at least to the 
extent that subchapter IV and SIPA are inconsistent with one another.
214
 If 
that occurs, SIPC—or, more precisely, the trustee that SIPC designates—
would oversee the administration of the liquidation of both the futures and 
the securities sides of the business, notwithstanding that only securities 
customers would be entitled to insurance compensation in the event that, 
after all efforts to retrieve customer property, customer property remains 
insufficient to satisfy customer claims.
215
  
 
 
 210. See Futures Brokerage Activities and Futures Commission Merchants, in TRADING AND 
CAPITAL-MARKETS ACTIVITIES MANUAL § 3030.1, at 5 n.5 (1998), available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/trading/3000p3.pdf (“Many FCMs also are SEC-registered as 
broker-dealers . . . .”).  
 211. See id.  
 212. See 11 U.S.C. § 742 (2012); see also supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Bankruptcy, 48 Fed. Reg. 8716, 8720 (Mar. 1, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 190) 
(“The [CFTC] is aware that the potential for an interpretation giving only limited recognition to 
subchapter IV under SIPA may well raise problems in implementing that subchapter in a joint 
bankruptcy.”). 
 214. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-1(b) (2012) (“To the extent consistent with the provisions of [SIPA] 
. . . , a [SIPA] trustee shall be subject to the same duties as a trustee in a case under chapter 7 of [the 
Bankruptcy Code], including, if the debtor is a commodity broker, . . . the duties specified in 
subchapter IV of such chapter 7 . . . .”). 
 215. This conclusion arises inevitably from the fact that SIPA’s protections apply only to 
securities brokerage customers and do not apply to customers holding other types of accounts. See 
supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text (describing SIPA and the insurance coverage that it 
provides). The liquidation of MF Global exemplified this result. The trustee for the liquidation of both 
the firm’s securities brokerage business and its futures brokerage business was a SIPC designee. See 
Nick Brown, MF Global Clients Face Shortfall Despite Protections, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2011, 6:54 
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The less-than-ideal result for futures customers is evident from two 
perspectives. First, staying chapter 7 may mean not only that subchapter 
IV of chapter 7 is inapplicable, but also that the CFTC’s Part 190 rules, 
including the Recourse Rule, are inapplicable. After all, the CFTC adopted 
the Part 190 rules pursuant to Congress’s subchapter IV-specific grant of 
authority
216—and, by all accounts, the Recourse Rule is inconsistent with 
SIPA, which, like the Bankruptcy Code, does not contemplate recourse to 
the estate’s assets in the event of a shortfall in customer assets. Second, 
there arises the possibility of conflicts of interest on the part of the SIPC 
trustee. Specifically, if a question were to arise regarding whether 
particular property should be deemed futures customer property 
distributable to futures customers in satisfaction of their claims or whether 
it should be deemed securities customer property distributable to securities 
customers in satisfaction of their claims, the SIPC trustee may have an 
incentive to label it as the latter in order to minimize the amount that 
ultimately may need to be paid from the insurance pool that SIPC is 
responsible for maintaining.
217
 
2. Invalidity 
Not every FCM is a joint registrant, of course, and subchapter IV and 
the Part 190 rules will apply in the event that any such FCM becomes 
insolvent (since there will be no reason to stay those provisions). Even in 
those circumstances, however, it is far from certain that the Recourse Rule 
would apply if the need were to arise—that is, if there were a shortfall of 
customers’ assets that could not be remedied by locating other assets of 
the FCM’s estate otherwise constituting customer property. That 
uncertainty arises from the fact that those who stand to lose from the 
Rule’s application—namely, the estate’s unsecured creditors—are likely to 
challenge its applicability, primarily based on the contention that it goes 
 
 
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mfglobal-customers-idUSTRE7A77S420111109, archived at 
https://perma.cc/SC5Z-RTE6 (describing how, despite SIPC’s involvement in the MF Global 
liquidation, SIPA covers only securities brokerage customers); Mike Spector & Aaron Lucchetti, SIPC 
Appoints Trustee to Take Over MF Global’s Brokerage, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 31, 2011, 4:42 PM), http:// 
blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/10/31/sipc-to-appoint-trustee-to-take-over-mf-globals-brokerage/, archived 
at https://perma.cc/PS4Y-LQJV (reporting that SIPC had appointed a trustee). 
 216. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text. 
 217. See Andrea M. Corcoran, Bankruptcy Pitfalls for Dually-Licensed Brokerage Firms, 12 
FUTURES INT’L L. LETTER 1, 6 (1993) (describing conflicts that may arise from the fact that SIPA 
insurance covers only securities brokerage accounts, including that an insurer “may want to limit the 
extent of any claim on its own funds”). 
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too far.
218
 And, indeed, at least one federal court, in In re Griffin Trading 
Company,
219
 agreed with that argument, concluding that the provision was 
invalid under the first prong of the Chevron test.
220
 
The general argument against the Recourse Rule’s validity proceeds 
along the following lines: The Bankruptcy Code affirms general regulatory 
authority to expand the definition of customer property contained in 
section 761(10) of subchapter IV.
221
 Subsection (A)(ix) of that section, 
recall, states that customer property includes other property of the FCM 
that, under applicable laws and rules, is required to be held for a 
customer’s benefit.222 In addition, at the time Congress enacted subchapter 
IV, Congress also enacted section 24 of the CEA, pursuant to which the 
CFTC may, for purposes of subchapter IV and notwithstanding any 
provisions to the contrary in Chapter 11, provide that “certain cash, 
securities, other property, or commodity contracts are to be included in or 
excluded from customer property.”223 At first blush, these two provisions 
seem to support one another in authorizing the CFTC’s adoption of the 
Recourse Rule.  
The difficulty with the Recourse Rule, and the factor that may cause it 
to fail Chevron analysis, however, stems from another provision of 
subchapter IV—namely, section 766(j)(2).224 That section provides that “if 
a customer is not paid the full amount of such customer’s allowed net 
equity claim from customer property, the unpaid portion of such claim is a 
claim entitled to distribution under section 726 of this title.”225 Section 
726, for its part, specifies the order of priority of unsecured creditors of the 
estate.
226
 As a result of section 766(j)(2), then, any customer with a 
shortfall remaining after a full distribution of customer property is to be 
 
 
 218. Most recently, the creditors of MF Global challenged the validity of the Recourse Rule. See 
Trustee’s Response to Briefing Regarding the Legal Principles and Framework for Allocation and 
Distribution of Customer Property at 4–5, In re MF Global Holdings Ltd., No. 11-15059 (MG) (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2012), available at http://dm.epiq11.com/MFG/Document/GetDocument/1555541. 
 219. In re Griffin Trading Co., 245 B.R. 291 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 
270 B.R. 882 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 220. See id. at 317. Under Chevron, a court evaluates an agency’s rulemaking by focusing on 
whether Congress expressly addressed the question at issue (prong 1) or, if not, whether the agency’s 
reading of the statute is a permissible construction (prong 2). Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
 221. 11 U.S.C. § 761(10) (2012). 
 222. See id. § 761(10)(A)(ix). 
 223. 7 U.S.C. § 24 (2012). 
 224. 11 U.S.C. § 766(j)(2) (2012). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. § 726 (generally providing that unsecured claims as to which proof has been timely filed 
have priority over unsecured claims as to which proof has not been timely filed, which have priority 
over claims for fines, penalties, or damages). 
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treated as a general unsecured creditor of the FCM’s estate, meaning that 
customers and general unsecured creditors must share the same pool of 
assets.
227
 That result is, on its face, inconsistent with the Recourse Rule, 
which, again, provides that customers are entitled to assets of the estate 
ahead of unsecured creditors until customers’ claims have been paid in 
full: If there are insufficient estate assets to satisfy customers’ claims, then 
unsecured creditors will receive nothing.
228
 If there are sufficient estate 
assets to satisfy customers’ claims, then unsecured creditors will have 
exclusive claim to the remaining estate assets after all customer claims 
have been paid.
229
 Either way, section 766(j)(2) is rendered 
meaningless,
230
 an outcome that, according to the Griffin court, both 
counters the “clear” intent of Congress that section 766(j)(2) expresses231 
and produces an outcome that canons of statutory construction seek to 
avoid.
232
 
Additionally, section 24 of the CEA may be read to support section 
766(j)(2). Section 24, as noted above, provides that the CFTC may add 
“certain . . . property” to what subchapter IV considers to be customer 
property.
233
 Pointing to section 24, the Griffin court opined that “the 
authority to include or exclude ‘certain’ . . . property is not authority to 
include any or all property in general.”234 The court noted that, in the Part 
190 rules, the CFTC included as customer property the proceeds of letters 
of credit received to secure a futures contract, property pledged to an FCM 
as security for a loan, and funds recovered to eliminate a debit balance in a 
customer account.
235
 Each of those items of property, in the court’s view, 
is a specific and discrete item and, therefore, may rest on stronger statutory 
 
 
 227. See id. § 766(j)(2). 
 228. See In re Griffin Trading Co., 245 B.R. 291, 315–16 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000), vacated on 
other grounds, 270 B.R. 882 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (observing that, if there are insufficient assets in the 
estate to cover the shortfall, then “invoking § 766(j)(2) with the [Recourse Rule] in place would be an 
exercise in futility, because there would be nothing left in the estate to be paid out under . . . § 726”). 
 229. See id. at 315 (observing that, if there are sufficient assets in the estate to cover the shortfall, 
then “there would be no customers who were not paid the full amounts of their claims, and the event 
which would trigger § 766(j)(2) . . . would never occur”). 
 230. See id. (noting that, under either of the alternative scenarios, “§ 766(j)(2) is made 
superfluous”). 
 231. See id. at 311 (observing that “Congressional intent is clear from the text of § 766(j)(2)”). 
 232. See id. at 315 (“[T]he rule of statutory construction that avoids an interpretation of one 
section that renders another section meaningless also leads to the conclusion that the [Recourse Rule] 
is invalid and must be stricken.”). 
 233. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 234. In re Griffin Trading Co., 245 B.R. at 311–12. 
 235. See id. at 311.  
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grounds as being “certain” property than the estate property referred to in 
the Recourse Rule.
236
  
Relatedly, the concept of customer property harbors a traceability 
requirement that the Recourse Rule arguably fails to meet. As suggested in 
Part II,
237
 section 761(10)’s definition of customer property begins by 
stating that “customer property means . . . property . . . received, acquired, 
or held by or for the account of the debtor, from or for the account of a 
customer.”238 In light of that preface, the section may be read to require 
that anything that the CFTC might deem to be customer property be 
traceable in some way to a customer’s account.239 Accordingly, although 
the section proceeds to list what items of property are included in the 
preface’s general description—a list that includes subsection (A)(ix), 
covering other property that applicable rules or regulations require to be 
set aside for the benefit of customers—the Recourse Rule may go beyond 
what section 761(10) permits.
240
 After all, it is likely the case that much, if 
not most, of the general property of an FCM’s estate is not property 
originating “from or for the account of a customer.”241 
3. Irrelevance 
As one might expect, there are other interpretations of subchapter IV 
and the Part 190 rules that produce a different conclusion about the 
validity of the Recourse Rule. This alternative conclusion begins with 
CFTC rule 1.20.
242
 That rule—which, recall, requires FCMs to segregate 
customer assets from proprietary assets
243—also effectively provides that, 
whatever may be the reason for a shortfall in customer segregated property 
that occurs during the course of an FCM’s operations, the FCM must fill 
the deficiency, even if doing so requires the FCM to use its own funds or 
other assets.
244
 Extending customer priority to a bankrupt FCM’s general 
estate, as the Recourse Rule does, may be regarded as consistent with that 
 
 
 236. See id. 
 237. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 238. 11 U.S.C. § 761(10) (2012). 
 239. See In re Griffin Trading Co., 245 B.R. at 312 (observing that section 761(10) “[p]lainly . . . 
requires that ‘customer property’ must come from . . . or be intended for the account of a customer”). 
 240. See id. at 317 (concluding that the Recourse Rule “does not harmonize with the language, 
origins, or purpose of [section 761(10)],” among other provisions). 
 241. 11 U.S.C. § 761(10) (2012). 
 242. 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(a) (2016). 
 243. See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text (summarizing section 4d and rule 1.20). 
 244. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(a) (requiring an FCM to maintain at all times “in the separate account or 
accounts money, securities and property in an amount at least sufficient in the aggregate to cover its 
total obligations to all futures customers”). 
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operational requirement. Of course, that insight cannot end the analysis. 
The fact that the Recourse Rule may be consistent with certain sections of 
the CEA does not mean that it is permitted by subchapter IV.  
There are other ways to view that analysis, however. Here, one must 
return to subsection (A)(ix) of section 761(10) of subchapter IV and its 
reference to “other property of the debtor” that, pursuant to “any 
applicable law, rule, or regulation,” the debtor is required to set aside or 
hold for the benefit of a customer.
245
 By its terms, that provision does not 
say that such other property of the debtor actually has been set aside or 
held for the benefit of a customer. Rather, it refers only to other property 
that, under law or regulation, should have been set aside or held for 
customers.
246
 In other words, under applicable law, it is precisely in 
shortfall scenarios that property to which customers are entitled may not 
actually have been set aside for them. Hence, there arises the need to resort 
to the FCM’s own assets or, in a bankruptcy situation, the FCM’s general 
estate. 
This analysis also addresses the presumed traceability requirement of 
section 761(10): property that should have been set aside or held for 
customers arguably constitutes the property described in the preface, 
namely, “property . . . held by or for the account of the debtor . . . from or 
for the account of a customer.”247 The general estate property is held “for 
the account of the debtor,” but it is also “for the account of a customer” in 
the sense that customers have become entitled to it pursuant to CFTC rule 
1.20. As for CEA section 24, which authorizes the CFTC to designate 
“certain” property as customer property,248 one might argue that property 
of the debtor’s general estate is, itself, certain property. In any event, there 
is no apparent indication that Congress intended “certain” to encompass 
only discrete bits of property. 
That leaves section 766(j)(2) and its requirement that customers whose 
claims have not been paid after exhausting other sources of customer 
property stand in line with the estate’s unsecured creditors.249 Although 
Congress likely knew when it enacted 766(j)(2) that the CFTC would 
adopt rules that possibly expanded the definition of customer property, it 
could not have known what those rules would be. Certainly, unless the 
CFTC adopted a rule that would extend to the assets of the debtor’s 
 
 
 245. 11 U.S.C. § 761(10)(A)(ix) (2012); see also supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 246. 11 U.S.C. § 761(10)(A)(ix). 
 247. Id. § 761(10). 
 248. 7 U.S.C. § 24(a) (2012). 
 249. 11 U.S.C. § 766(j)(2); see also supra notes 224–32 and accompanying text. 
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general estate, there was a possibility that the aggregate property 
ultimately deemed customer property would not be sufficient to pay 
customers in full. One could argue that section 766(j)(2) merely serves as 
a backstop in the event the question should ever arise. Recall that the 
section provides that, in the event that a customer’s claim is not 
completely satisfied from the pool of customer property, the remaining 
portion of the claim is entitled to payment as an unsecured creditor 
claim.
250
 Under what circumstances might a customer’s claim not be paid 
in full from customer property, satisfying section 766(j)(2)’s condition? 
One such circumstance is the CFTC’s failure to adopt a rule that deems 
general estate assets as customer property when all other sources have 
been exhausted.
251
  
In any event, however, even if the Recourse Rule is ultimately 
determined to be a valid exercise of regulatory authority, it may not have 
the effect that the CFTC intended. In the event of an FCM bankruptcy in 
which a shortfall in customer assets requires paying customers’ claims 
from the FCM’s general estate, there quite likely will be insufficient assets 
in the estate because of how many FCMs—like many other financial 
services firms—are structured. In particular, FCMs are often part of a 
much larger group of affiliated entities, and, as a result, an FCM 
commonly is a subsidiary of another entity within the affiliated group.
252
 
Certainly that describes MF Global, Inc., which was owned by MF Global 
Holdings, Ltd. and had tens of entity affiliates,
253
 as well as the FCMs 
under the umbrellas of JP Morgan
254
 and Merrill Lynch,
255
 for example.  
 
 
 250. Id. 
 251. To be sure, this interpretation discounts, if not ignores entirely, the “construe-statutes-to-
avoid-surplusage” canon on which the Griffin court relied. See In re Griffin Trading Co., 245 B.R. 
291, 315 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 270 B.R. 882 (N.D. Ill. 2001). However, 
in the modern administrative state, ignoring canons of construction may be precisely what is required. 
See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely 
Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 562 (1992) (noting that canons of statutory construction are 
indeterminate and subject to misuse).  
 252. See Anita K. Krug, Escaping Entity-Centrism in Financial Services Regulation, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2039, 2043 (2013) (observing that firms, including financial services firms, “frequently are 
components of groups of affiliated entities that, together, pursue related or mutually beneficial 
activities as a larger enterprise”). 
 253. See Motion Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 for Entry of Order 
Approving Settlement Agreement Between the Debtor, the Trustee, MF Global UK Limited (in 
Special Administration) and MFGUK Joint Special Administrators at 4, In re MF Global Inc., 481 
B.R. 268 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-2790 (MG) SIPA), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ 
ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/mfgimfguksettlement122112.pdf, archived at perma.cc/ 
GQ6E-QUVD (“MFG Holdings . . . was the parent of nearly fifty direct or indirect subsidiaries . . . .”).  
 254. See Press Release, Reuters, Fitch Assigns Initial ‘AA-/F1+’ Ratings to J.P. Morgan Securities 
LLC (July 29, 2011) (noting that J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, a registered FCM, is a wholly-owned 
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Given that a bankrupt FCM, for all practical purposes, may have been 
controlled and operated by a separate entity, the FCM may be more poorly 
capitalized than might be the case if it had operated as a standalone 
entity.
256
 The parent company, after all, may have had ample reason to 
distribute to itself any assets of the FCM beyond what might be necessary 
for the FCM to meet regulatory capital requirements.
257
 Yet neither the 
Recourse Rule nor any other part of subchapter IV or the Part 190 rules 
palpably contemplates that FCMs are situated within parent-subsidiary 
arrangements. Therefore, those rules do not address the relevance of any 
entity’s assets other than the bankrupt FCM’s. To be sure, every FCM 
ownership arrangement is different, but arguably the picture is less optimal 
for customers the more the entity that is the FCM resembles just another 
asset of a much larger entity or group of entities.  
IV. THE FUTURE OF FCM REGULATION 
The predominant lesson from Part III is that existing regulatory 
protections of FCM customers, even if more robust than they were five 
years ago, are still far from adequate. Customers open accounts with 
FCMs and deposit funds, as banking customers do with banks. They 
expect those funds to be available for their use in transacting in futures, 
just as banking customers expect account deposits to be available for their 
use in buying goods and services. They understand that their activities in 
the futures markets may cause losses to their accounts—if they enter into 
losing trades, for example—much as banking customers understand that 
their own uses of deposited funds will diminish the value of their accounts. 
And, given that they engage an FCM only to provide brokerage services in 
connection with transactions they have chosen to effect, they surely expect 
their account deposits to be safe, just as banking customers do. Yet the 
analogy between holding funds in a futures account with an FCM and 
holding assets in a bank account goes only so far because, unlike bank 
deposits, deposits with an FCM are not adequately protected. 
 
 
subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase & Co.). 
 255. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Rule 1.55(k) AND (O): FCM-Specific 
Disclosure Document, BANK OF AM. MERRILL LYNCH, http://corp.bankofamerica.com/business/bi/ 
commodity-futures-trading-commission-rule-1.55-k- (last visited Mar. 30, 2016), archived at 
https://perma.cc/BT6A-ZDEQ (noting that the Merrill Lynch entity that acts as an FCM is an indirect 
subsidiary of Bank of America Corporation). 
 256. See Krug, supra note 252, at 2079–80 (describing how parent entities of financial services 
subsidiaries may not ensure that those subsidiaries are sufficiently capitalized). 
 257. See id. 
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The weaknesses in procedural regulation governing FCMs are all the 
more troublesome given that the futures markets are no longer the 
province of commercial enterprises that rely on futures for hedging 
purposes and other institutional and sophisticated traders. Rather, futures 
traders—and, therefore, futures customers—increasingly are retail market 
participants who use futures to further diversify their portfolios and who 
generally have an inadequate understanding of the risks posed by FCMs 
and unreasonable expectations about the safety of placing assets with 
them.
258
 What, then, is to be done? Part IV.A proposes an answer, one that 
encompasses several reinforcing measures that not only would go far in 
plugging the gaping holes in the procedural regulation of FCMs, but that 
also would bolster market confidence, which was badly damaged by MF 
Global’s and PFGBest’s bankruptcies. Part IV.B evaluates the proposed 
reforms from the perspective of the unique history of futures regulation. It 
argues that, given the particular evolution of futures regulation in the 
United States, the reforms would help transform the status of the futures 
markets within the broader financial markets. 
A. Regulatory Reform 
As Part III describes, the CFTC’s rules are formulated such that FCMs 
need not be hands off. That is, an FCM may invest customer deposits in 
certain instruments and may buy and sell those instruments pursuant to 
resale and repurchase agreements.
259
 Apart from the fact that an FCM’s 
use of customer assets in these ways necessarily involves risk is the fact 
that that use gives rise to conflicts of interest that may affect the FCM’s 
ability to stay within the confines of regulatory requirements.
260
 That 
circumstance is exacerbated by the fact that there is no equivalent to SIPC 
or the FDIC, meaning that deficiencies in customer assets that may exist at 
the time of the FCM’s insolvency must be borne by customers.  
Of course, Congress enacted special provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code, set forth in subchapter IV of chapter 7, and the CFTC adopted 
 
 
 258. See Dan Weil, Alternative Mutual Funds: Are They Worth It?, BANKRATE (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/investing/are-liquid-alternative-mutual-funds-worth-it.aspx (noting 
that many mutual funds now transact in futures and other deriviatives and that their doing so 
“obviously brings in risk, and the average investor loses the ability to understand”). 
 259. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text (describing the ways in which FCMs may 
invest customer assets). 
 260. See supra notes 194–203 and accompanying text (discussing conflicts associated with a 
financial services provider’s use of customer assets for its own benefit). 
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special rules to specify that customers have priority in liquidation.
261
 Yet, 
if customer assets cannot be located and retrieved under the doctrine of 
tracing,
262
 and if the liquidation takes place under subchapter IV—not a 
given for insolvent FCMs that are jointly registered as securities brokers—
even those special rules may not help.
263
 This Subpart describes the 
measures that Congress and the CFTC should pursue to overcome the 
significant problems associated with the procedural regulation of FCMs 
and additionally discusses why establishing a futures-specific insurance 
program is not among them. 
1. Investment of Customer Assets 
In light of the concerns this Article identifies, the operational 
requirements applicable to FCMs should be reformulated. Most 
importantly, rule 1.25, the rule permitting FCMs to invest customer assets, 
should be eliminated. Such a change, of course, may seem too drastic, too 
much of a pendulum swing, given the efforts that FCMs have expended 
over the past sixteen years to have the CFTC broaden the rule’s scope. 
Specifically, prior to 2000, the rule had been relatively conservative, 
permitting FCMs’ investment of customer assets only in instruments that 
the CEA expressly describes, which are widely deemed to be particularly 
safe.
264
 However, industry pressure led to the CFTC’s expansion of 
authorized instruments to include more risky ones, including corporate and 
sovereign debt obligations.
265
 Thereafter, the rule remained largely 
unchanged until the CFTC amended it in the aftermath of MF Global’s 
bankruptcy.
266
 Nonetheless, prior to those most recent amendments, 
certain FCMs—MF Global among them—regarded the rule as sufficiently 
 
 
 261. See supra notes 120–31 and accompanying text (describing the FCM-specific bankruptcy 
rules). 
 262. Tracing is a remedy in equity that permits aggrieved parties “to track their assets after they 
have been taken by [f]raud, misappropriation, or mistake.” Tracing, THE FREE DICTIONARY, 
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Tracing (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).  
 263. See supra notes 210–56 and accompanying text (describing problems associated with the 
bankruptcy provisions).  
 264. See CFTC Amendment Release, supra note 114, at 78,776 (observing that the CEA permits 
FCMs to invest customer funds in “obligations of the United States and obligations fully guaranteed as 
to principal and interest by the United States (U.S. government securities) and general obligations of 
any State or of any political subdivision thereof (municipal securities)”). 
 265. See id. (describing the expansion of rule 1.25 in 2000). 
 266. See generally id. (adopting the most recent amendments to rule 1.25); see also supra notes 
172–73 and accompanying text (describing investments currently permitted under rule 1.25). 
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important to their businesses to lobby against any changes that would 
make it more restrictive.
267
  
Despite the fact that FCMs may once have had designs on the rule as a 
potentially meaningful source of profits, given the rule’s current content, 
that can no longer be the case. In that regard, the new world has already 
arrived. Yet, if investing customer assets can no longer produce the reward 
for which FCMs may have once hoped, the continuing risks to customers 
associated with investments under rule 1.25 remain substantial. As 
discussed above, those risks arise less from the rule’s use than from its 
misuse—or, at least, the inevitable temptation to misuse it.268  
Beyond that consideration is an additional one, stemming from the fact 
that futures are very different from securities. Futures, unlike securities, 
are not repositories of investment capital; they are contracts obligating 
each side to do something at a future time.
269
 Obtaining leverage through 
borrowing funds has no meaning in the futures context because leverage is 
an inherent and inseparable component of each and every futures 
contract.
270
 This leverage is the product of the fact that the possible gains 
(or losses) on any futures transaction are multiples of what the trader is 
required to supply as margin.
271
 Accordingly, although rule 1.25 permits 
an FCM’s use of customer assets, that use, unlike in the securities context, 
is not symbiotic with or dependent on the services the FCM provides to its 
customers. That is suggested by the fact that, in contrast to a securities 
broker, an FCM may invest its customers’ assets pursuant to rule 1.25, 
regardless of whether it has loaned cash or securities to the customers or 
provided other, non-brokerage services to them. That difference, 
moreover, renders rule 1.25 all the more dispensable. 
 
 
 267. See Daniel P. Collins, Debate Over On Rule 1.25: MF Global Effect, FUTURES (Jan. 1, 2012), 
http://www.futuresmag.com/2012/01/01/debate-over-on-rule-125, archived at https://perma.cc/25PB-
UKEN (“MF Global had lobbied against changes that would restrict [FCMs’] . . . ability to invest in 
sovereign debt and execute repurchase agreements with affiliates.”). 
 268. See supra notes 196–203 and accompanying text. And, of course, additional risks arise from 
the fact that rule 1.25 continues to countenance repurchase and resale agreements. See also 17 C.F.R. 
§1.25(a)(2)(i) (2016).  
 269. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (explaining how futures transactions are 
structured). 
 270. See Leverage, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/ 
Leverage (last visited Mar. 30, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/RH43-JFNX (noting that a futures 
contract embodies a “type of leverage”). 
 271. See Futures Fundamentals: Characteristics, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
university/futures/futures4.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/KY8V-LDY7 
(“The smaller the margin in relation to the cash value of the futures contract, the higher the 
leverage.”). 
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More, however, is necessary. After all, even without rule 1.25, an 
FCM’s insolvency could cause a shortfall in customer assets. As Part II 
details, the activities of some customers, such as their “defaulting” by 
failing to replenish exhausted deposits, may lead to a deficiency in 
customer assets.
272
 In addition, as MF Global’s and PFGBest’s respective 
bankruptcies demonstrated,
273
 a shortfall might also result from an FCM’s 
misuse or its personnel’s theft of customer assets—a possibility that the 
CFTC’s recent rulemaking did not (indeed, could not) eliminate 
completely.
 
 
2. Bankruptcy Rules 
That brings the analysis to the bankruptcy rules that apply to FCMs—
the provisions of subchapter IV of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and 
the CFTC’s Part 190 rules, including the Recourse Rule. The bankruptcy 
rules are potentially very protective of customers, since, in the context of a 
shortfall of customer assets, if the shortfall is not otherwise eliminated 
through tracing procedures, customers’ remaining losses will be covered 
by the assets of the bankrupt FCM’s estate, ahead of payment of other 
creditors’ claims.274 Recall, however, that there are a number of problems 
associated with those rules.  
First, given that FCMs are often regulated also as securities brokers, in 
the event of a bankruptcy it is unlikely that the provisions of subchapter IV 
or the Part 190 rules would apply, as they would be stayed pursuant to 
SIPA, the statute governing securities broker bankruptcies.
275
 Second, the 
fact that the Recourse Rule is an agency creation, rather than a 
Congressional mandate, means that its enforceability is uncertain.
276
 Third, 
even if the Rule ultimately were determined to be valid and enforceable, 
its application might still be insufficient to compensate customers 
completely if, as is likely, the FCM is a subsidiary within a multi-entity 
 
 
 272. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra notes 151–61 and accompanying text (noting the causes of both bankruptcies). 
 274. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
 275. See supra notes 210–17 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra notes 218–40 and accompanying text. In any bankruptcy in which the Recourse 
Rule might apply, the estate’s unsecured creditors would almost certainly contest its validity because, 
as a result of the Rule’s application, it would leave them with a smaller pie to share than would be the 
case if customers were deemed unsecured creditors to the extent of any remaining shortfall. See supra 
notes 214–17 and accompanying text (highlighting one case in which an FCM’s creditors contested the 
validity of the Recourse Rule). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss5/6
  
 
 
 
 
2016] UNCERTAIN FUTURES IN EVOLVING FINANCIAL MARKETS 1261 
 
 
 
 
enterprise.
277
 If that is the case, most of the “firm’s” remaining assets may 
be held by its parent entity and therefore beyond the rule’s reach.  
Given the substantial difficulties with subchapter IV and the Part 190 
rules, Congress should amend SIPA and possibly also the Bankruptcy 
Code to reflect that, to the extent that there is a shortfall of customer assets 
in the context of an FCM bankruptcy, the protective provisions of 
subchapter IV and the Part 190 rules will apply, notwithstanding that SIPA 
may otherwise govern the FCM’s liquidation. In the process, Congress 
should augment subchapter IV by including a provision equivalent to the 
Recourse Rule or, at least, by affirming the CFTC’s authority to adopt 
such a rule. In addition, both Congress and the CFTC should clarify their 
respective bankruptcy provisions to allow customers who must turn to 
estate assets for complete compensation to have recourse, if necessary, 
also to any entity that, as a parent company, controls the FCM and its 
capitalization.
278
 
Of course, as noted above, while ensuring the return of customer 
deposits that should never have been at risk is a worthy goal, it is one that 
may substantially impact the rights of third parties, namely, creditors. 
There is, however, a fairly straightforward response to this concern: 
Creditors—at least voluntary ones—should be able to negotiate for 
protections ex ante, such as by conditioning an extension of credit to an 
FCM on a commitment not to engage in risky trading and investment 
activities involving customer deposits.
279
 Or, to avoid concerns that the 
FCM would breach that agreement, the creditor could demand sufficient 
collateral.
280
 The point is that prospective creditors (even unsecured 
creditors), unlike most prospective futures customers (even institutional 
customers), have the ability to take action; they generally (although not 
always) have negotiating leverage vis-à-vis the FCM. Their exercise of 
that leverage, moreover, could redound to the benefit of customers, in light 
of the disciplining effect that it might have on the FCM’s activities.  
 
 
 277. See supra notes 252–57 and accompanying text. 
 278. Another possible proposal, aimed at addressing problems arising from the fact that FCMs are 
often parts of larger, multi-entity financial enterprises might be for Congress to require that FCMs be 
legally separate from other financial services firms. For a number of reasons, largely based on 
considerations of economic practicality and the increasing necessity of financial firms to diversify their 
services, this Article does not pursue that proposal.  
 279. Cf. Roe, supra note 35, at 571 (contending, in another context, that if creditors are aware of 
the possible adverse consequences of a borrower’s bankruptcy, they can negotiate for protections). 
 280. Cf. id. 
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3. Insurance 
As noted above, one difference between the procedural regulation of 
FCMs and that of securities brokers is that the former has no insurance 
program that may be called upon to compensate customers of an insolvent 
FCM in the event there is insufficient customer property to pay customers 
the amount to which they are entitled.
281
 That fact came into stark relief in 
2011 and 2012, thanks to the turn of events at MF Global and PFGBest.
282
 
As Part III suggests, those firms’ dramatic bankruptcies suggested to many 
observers that the procedural regulation of FCMs as it then existed could 
not accomplish the job that it was supposed to do.
283
 Although the CFTC 
responded by amending some of its rules and adopting several new 
ones,
284
 reform-related discussions largely centered on the prospect of 
implementing an insurance regime, such as one modeled after that set forth 
in SIPA in the securities regulatory context.
285
 It had become apparent, 
after all, that futures brokerage customers faced risks not unlike those 
confronting securities brokerage customers. 
Regulators and market participants proposed several different models 
of futures customer insurance coverage, with two alternatives garnering 
the most support.
286
 In one model, an entity called the Futures Insurance 
and Customer Protection Corporation (“FICPC”) would pay futures 
brokerage customers as much as $250,000 to compensate them for losses 
they might incur as a result of an FCM’s failure to maintain sufficient 
 
 
 281. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 151–61 and accompanying text (describing the MF Global and PFGBest 
bankruptcies). 
 283. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text (noting some market participants’ reaction to 
the bankruptcies). 
 284. See supra notes 172–80 and accompanying text (describing the regulatory changes that 
occurred in the bankruptcies’ aftermath). 
 285. See, e.g., JOHN L. ROE, COMMODITY CUSTOMER COAL., RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE POLICY 
RESPONSE TO THE MF GLOBAL BANKRUPTCY 10 (2012), available at http://commoditycusto 
mercoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CCC-Recommendations-on-the-Policy-Response-to-the 
-Bankruptcy-of-MF-Global-FINAL.pdf (advocating “an account insurance mechanism for 
commodities customers” on the basis that it would “be an effective, economical means to shield 
commodity customers from insolvency risk”); Bart Chilton, Comm’r, U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n, The Plan, Stan—Moving Forward on a Futures Insurance Fund (Aug. 9, 2012) 
(proposing the establishment of a “futures insurance fund”); Press Release, Nat’l Grain & Feed Ass’n, 
NGFA Sends Congress, CFTC Proposed Changes to Bankruptcy Code, Other Measures to Protect 
Against Future MF Global-Type Liquidations (July 3, 2012) (noting that the National Grain and Feed 
Association had recommended to Congress that it establish “insurance protection for commodity 
futures accounts”).  
 286. As yet, neither model—nor any other insurance proposal—has gained sufficient traction 
among policymakers to move forward.  
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assets in its segregated account.
287
 To fund the insurance pool, each FCM 
would be required to contribute 0.5% of its annual gross revenues arising 
from futures transactions until a targeted funding amount of $2.5 billion 
had been attained.
288
 According to some estimates, reaching that target 
funding level would take approximately fifty-five years (assuming that 
there were no losses in the interim).
289
 A second model, by contrast, would 
involve the creation of a captive insurance company—the Futures Industry 
Customer Asset Protection Insurance Company (“FICAP”)—that would 
be owned by FCMs on a purely voluntary basis.
290
 In the event of an FCM 
insolvency requiring that the insurance pool be accessed, the FCMs 
participating in the company would cover the first $50 million of losses as 
a deductible of sorts.
291
 Up to $250 million more would be funded by 
FICAP—or, more specifically, a consortium of insurance companies—
subject to a maximum payout of $50 million for each participating 
FCM.
292
 
Although it might seem reasonable to extend insurance coverage to the 
futures brokerage context, doing so may not, in fact, be an appropriate 
solution. The primary argument that others have voiced against insurance 
centers on the prospect that it would unduly increase the cost of 
transacting in futures.
293
 After all, the costs associated with any insurance 
 
 
 287. See Joanne Morrison, Seg Funds Revisited: Industry Response to Peregrine and MF Global 
Collapses, FUTURES INDUSTRY MAG., Sept. 2012, at 24–25, available at https://secure.fia.org/ 
files/css/magazineArticles/article-1507.pdf (describing the details of the FICPC plan). 
 288. See id. 
 289. See Press Release, Karen Wuertz, Nat’l Futures Ass’n, Futures Industry Releases Insurance 
Study (Nov. 15, 2013) [hereinafter NFA Press Release] (observing that “it would take approximately 
55 years to reach the [FICPC] target funding level, assuming no interim losses”). The cost to the 
industry of such a program would be a product of a number of factors, including underwriting 
evaluations, the number of FCMs that participate in the program, and the arrangement settled on by the 
FCMs and the insurance companies. See Insurers Weigh Forming Captive to Insure Customers of 
Bankrupt Futures Brokers, INS. J. (Nov. 17, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/ 
2013/11/17/311506.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/9MQU-GQMN. According to a study by the 
CME Group, the Futures Industry Association, the Institute for Financial Markets, and the National 
Futures Association, even if the $2.5 billion funding level is ultimately reached, “a government 
backstop would likely be necessary” in the short term to fill the gap between potential customer claims 
and funds available. NFA Press Release, supra. 
 290. See NFA Press Release, supra note 289. 
 291. See id. 
 292. See id. An alternative possibility regarding insurance might be for customers to buy 
insurance privately, apart from organized arrangements. However, if customers do not fully appreciate 
the risks that they face as FCM customers—and it is likely that even sophisticated customers do not—
there may not develop a sufficient market for such insurance. 
 293. See Goldsmith, supra note 180, at 34–35 (noting that “industry leaders remain largely 
focused on the negatives of a futures protection fund, such as the high cost”); Alexander Osipovich, 
Post-MF Global Segregation Reforms Spark Fierce Debate, RISK (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www. 
risk.net/energy-risk/feature/2238649/postmf-global-segregation-reforms-spark-fierce-debate, archived 
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regime would ultimately be borne by futures customers, through higher 
commissions charged by FCMs.
294
 Another common contention centers on 
the age-old concern about moral hazard and, in particular, the notion that 
insurance encourages brokers to engage in excessively risky activities that 
place both customers and the brokers themselves at risk.
295
 Regardless of 
what activities a broker might pursue, the argument goes, it is assured of 
deposits from customers that, taking comfort in the security blanket that 
insurance provides, fail to evaluate the firm’s quality and financial 
soundness.
296
  
Once again, of course, there are alternative perspectives. If customers 
are the beneficiaries of insurance, should they not bear its costs? As for 
concerns about moral hazard, insurers could possibly serve as watchdogs, 
monitoring FCMs’ activities and thereby reducing both moral hazard risks 
and insurance costs. Whether that supposition is tenable is certainly a 
worthy area of exploration. Finally, if these difficulties are as formidable 
as some have suggested, are they not ones from which the SIPA insurance 
regime also suffers?  
For present purposes, however, the most important reason for 
eschewing an insurance regime covering FCM customers is that it would 
be largely ineffective as to the customers who need its protections the 
most—retail customers. Retail customers, by and large, obtain exposure to 
the futures markets through investing in mutual funds that engage in 
futures trading.
297
 Accordingly, it is those mutual funds—rather than the 
retail customers themselves—that are FCM customers. Being the 
aggregation tool that they are, mutual funds have large amounts of 
capital—often hundreds of millions or billions of dollars—to put to work 
toward their investment strategies.
298
 In the event that a mutual fund were 
 
 
at https://perma.cc/2X98-3JAW (discussing concerns about the cost associated with a customer 
insurance program). 
 294. See Osipovich, supra note 293 (observing that an insurance program would “essentially 
impos[e] a transaction tax on futures market participants”). 
 295. See Goldsmith, supra note 293, at 34 (citing the concern that insurance protection creates a 
“moral hazard risk”). 
 296. Cf. David Min, How Government Guarantees Promote Housing Finance Stability, 50 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 437, 460 (2013) (noting the oft-cited concern in the bubble-era mortgage-lending context 
that government guarantees backing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “created a form of moral hazard 
which encouraged these two private companies to maximize their risk-taking”). 
 297. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.  
 298. See Richard Loth, Mutual Fund Asset Size, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
university/quality-mutual-fund/chp5-fund-size/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2016), archived at 
https://perma.cc/KV64-7J3A (citing research finding that “during the 2001-2005 period the number of 
$1 billion-plus funds grew from 730 to 1,123” and that “among small cap funds, the figure went from 
36 to 81”). 
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a customer of an FCM that became insolvent under circumstances creating 
a shortfall in customer assets, the necessary per-customer cap on insurance 
proceeds would have the effect that each of the mutual fund’s investors 
would be compensated for only a portion (likely a small portion) of the 
losses that she incurred as a result of the shortfall. After all, $500,000 (or 
so) in insurance proceeds will go only so far in covering losses of possibly 
millions of dollars.  
Beyond that consideration is the fact that insurance is unnecessary—or, 
at least, it would be unnecessary if the other reforms proposed above were 
adopted. To be sure, these reform measures are relatively incremental—
they can be achieved, after all, without rewriting either the Bankruptcy 
Code or the CFTC’s rules. Yet they would substantially shore up the 
existing procedural regulation of FCMs.  
B. The Significance of Reform 
There is another reason, unexplored to date, why reforming the 
procedural regulation governing FCMs is necessary: It would be the last, 
critical step in bringing FCM regulation, and the regulation of the US 
futures markets generally, into the modern era of investment and 
diversification. Appreciating how that is so begins with the long and 
serpentine road from the earliest forms of futures market regulation to 
today’s regulatory regime. As this Subpart’s journey down that road 
reveals, although reform efforts throughout the decades consistently 
recognized that the futures markets had evolved from the earliest era, in 
which only farmers and associated traders legitimately used futures, they 
nonetheless remained firmly oriented toward it. 
Congress first attempted to regulate the futures markets in the late 
1800s, but the first federal legislation directly governing futures trading 
came about in 1921, with the passage of the Futures Trading Act.
299
 The 
primary change effected by that statute was the designation of particular 
futures exchanges as “contract markets” on which futures trading could 
occur.
300
 After the Supreme Court declared the Futures Trading Act to be 
unconstitutional in 1922,
301
 Congress replaced it with the Grain Futures 
 
 
 299. See History of the CFTC, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc. 
gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_precftc (last visited Mar. 30, 2016), archived at https://perma. 
cc/AT43-5N63. 
 300. See id. (“Under the Future Trading Act, the Secretary of Agriculture is empowered to 
designate exchanges that meet certain requirements enumerated in the Act as ‘contract markets’ in 
grain futures.”). 
 301. See Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68–70 (1922). 
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Act of 1922, which, though substantially the same, additionally mandated 
that futures exchanges work to halt manipulative conduct in the futures 
markets.
302
 The Grain Futures Act, for its part, was superseded in 1936 by 
the CEA, which, however, retained its predecessor’s core regulatory 
approach: regulation through the requirement that futures trading take 
place only on federally authorized contract markets.
303
 At the time it 
enacted the CEA, Congress also created the Commodity Exchange 
Commission to administer and enforce the new statute. The Secretary of 
Agriculture, who was one of the three members of that Commission,
304
 in 
turn created the Commodity Exchange Authority to carry out day-to-day 
regulatory responsibilities.
305
 
By 1974, the shortcomings of the Commodity Exchange Authority had 
become evident and included a lack of professional skills among 
employees and enforcement authority that was too limited to effectively 
regulate the ever-expanding futures markets.
306
 Accordingly, that year, 
through enacting the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act 
(“CFTC Act”), Congress established the CFTC to replace the Commodity 
Exchange Authority and, in so doing, amended the CEA to grant the 
CFTC substantial investigative, enforcement, and emergency authority.
307
 
The CFTC Act also amended the CEA to establish additional categories of 
regulated persons—commodity trading advisors and another group of 
professionals known as commodity pool operators, which operate futures-
focused funds
308—based on the recognition that futures market 
participants increasingly were enlisting the assistance of advisors to pursue 
their futures trading activities and engaged in trading through collective, or 
“pooled,” investment entities, often structured as privately-offered 
funds.
309
 Those changes, taken together, brought the CEA to the general 
form that it maintained until it was extensively amended in 2010 in 
 
 
 302. See MARKHAM, supra note 10, at 15 (“The Grain Futures Act also sought to prevent price 
manipulation by requiring exchanges to act to prevent such conduct.”). 
 303. See id. (discussing the CEA and observing that “Congress still seeks to regulate futures 
trading by subjecting it to the requirement that such transactions be conducted on a ‘contract market,’ 
licensed by the federal government”). 
 304. The other two members of the Commission were the Attorney General and the Secretary of 
Commerce. See id. at 27. 
 305. See id. 
 306. See id. at 61–65 (discussing the perceived inefficacy of the Commodity Exchange Authority 
in enforcing the CEA). 
 307. See id. at 65–72 (describing the powers granted to the CFTC). 
 308. See id. at 67–68. 
 309. Jeffrey S. Rosen, Regulation of Commodity Pool Operators Under the Commodity Exchange 
Act, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 939–44 (1983) (describing the role of commodity trading advisors 
and commodity pool operators and Congress’s rationale for regulating them). 
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connection with Congress’s enactment of Dodd-Frank.310 In the interim, 
however, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 to add 
subchapter IV
311
 and amended the CEA in 2000 to address the regulatory 
status of swaps,
312
 and the CFTC adopted a variety of rules, including 
rules governing disclosures by FCMs, commodity trading advisors, and 
commodity pool operators, as well as, of course, its Part 190 rules.
313
 
Each new regulatory measure from 1921 through the 1970s further 
strengthened the futures regulatory regime and the regulatory body in 
charge of administering it and further recognized the diversity of futures 
market participants. For present purposes, however, the more important 
unifying thread is that each measure came about in order to prevent price 
manipulation and other abusive practices that, since the beginning of 
futures trading in the United States, had been rampant. For example, the 
Futures Trading Act of 1921 was the product of years of volatility in 
agricultural commodity prices that harmed farmers.
314
 And one of the 
rationales for the CEA was to stop “bear raids” and “squeezes” that had 
the same effect but that previous forms of regulation had not adequately 
addressed.
315
 As Congress noted when it was considering the statute, the 
goal behind it was to “insure fair practice and honest dealing on the 
commodity exchanges, and to provide some measure of control over those 
forms of speculative activity which . . . disrupt the markets to the damage 
of producers and consumers.”316 Similarly, the CFTC Act was preceded by 
widespread concern that market-damaging trading activities, including 
manipulative trading that caused erratic changes in prices, were adversely 
affecting grain growers and, with them, consumers.
317
 
In this day and age, the striking aspect of the concerns that led to 
regulatory reform is not that they were centered on market manipulation 
and its effects. That concern, which is, at heart, a concern with market 
stability, has also always been a fundamental basis of securities regulation, 
 
 
 310. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). 
 311. See supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text (summarizing the content of subchapter IV). 
 312. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 primarily had the effect of removing 
swaps from the CFTC’s (and the SEC’s) regulatory jurisdiction. See Pub. L. No. 106-554 app. E, 
§§ 103, 107, 114 Stat. 2763A-365, 377–78, 382–83 (2000).  
 313. The CFTC was particularly active with rulemaking in the early years of its existence. See 
MARKHAM, supra note 10, at 73–101 (detailing the CFTC’s rulemaking in its first years of 
operations). 
 314. See id. at 10–13 (describing policymakers’ concern with price fluctuations in the years prior 
to the enactment of the Futures Trading Act). 
 315. See id. at 12–13. 
 316. H.R. REP. No. 73-1637, at 1 (1934). 
 317. See MARKHAM, supra note 10, at 60–65. 
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among other forms of financial regulation.
318
 Rather, what is notable about 
the history of futures regulation is that there is no significant focus or 
emphasis on a second fundamental basis of securities and other financial 
regulation—namely, investor protection or, using the more appropriate 
term given the particular context, customer protection. 
Futures market regulation emerged and existed to stop abusive trading 
practices and to do so not for the purpose of protecting customers that use 
the futures markets for investment-related purposes but for the sake of 
commodity producers and consumers. Put another way, despite various 
modernizing reforms over the years, futures regulation has never 
completely entered the modern era of financial market participation, in 
which investors—including smaller, retail ones—hedge their securities 
(and other) investments through seeking exposure to a wide array of 
instruments and asset classes.
319
 They pursue this objective, moreover, not 
only through investments in hedge funds and placing assets with 
specialized investment advisers, but also through their investments in 
mutual funds. In short, the world of futures no longer consists only of 
farmers, consumers, and gamblers; now it consists of those groups plus 
you and me. 
This Article’s proposed reforms would take futures regulation further, 
not just through changing the words of the statute and the rulebook but 
also through changing what futures regulation does and what its aims are. 
By providing meaningful procedural regulation, the reforms would usher 
futures regulation forward and situate it alongside other types of financial 
regulation—securities regulation, in particular. To be sure, more 
 
 
 318. See Robert R. Bliss, Multiple Regulators and Insolvency Regimes: Obstacles to Efficient 
Supervision and Resolution, in THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 132, 140 (David G. 
Mayes & Geoffrey E. Wood eds., 2007) (“The policing of various criminal activities—fraud, money 
laundering, market manipulation, insider trading—remains a primary focus of securities regulation.”); 
INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 5 (2008), 
available at www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD265.pdf (listing “ensuring that markets are 
fair, efficient, and transparent” as a “core objective[]” of securities regulation); Testimony Concerning 
Enhancing Investor Protection and Regulation of the Securities Markets—Part II: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 74 (2009) (prepared statement of Mary 
L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ 
ts032609mls.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/WA2B-7PNC (“The securities laws and our rules, and 
the rules of the exchanges and the national securities association we supervise, prohibit fraudulent 
trading practices, manipulation of securities prices, insider trading and other abuses.”). 
 319. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (describing retail investors’ increasing 
participation in “alternative” mutual funds—that is, funds that pursue traditionally hedge-fund-like 
investment strategies); see also Jonathan Clements, Three Reasons This Is a Good Time to Be an 
Investor, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2014, 12:42 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/three-reasons-this-is-a-
good-time-to-be-an-investor-1405701775 (“Today, individual investors can build portfolios that would 
have been the envy of many institutional investors two decades ago.”). 
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thoroughgoing reform, such as reform placing futures regulation and 
securities regulation under the jurisdiction of a single regulator, would 
undoubtedly accomplish more on that front, while at the same time better 
rationalizing two important financial regulatory arenas that are becoming 
ever more similar but that are kept apart by their very different histories. 
However, heeding the maxim that we must not let the perfect be the enemy 
of the good, and given the realities of political will, the proposed reforms 
are a realistic and promising next step. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The concerns that plague the procedural regulation of FCMs are 
significant. Most worrisome is that retail investors are at risk in ways that 
have not been made apparent—at least not on any wide-scale basis. These 
concerns will not alleviate themselves or otherwise dissipate without 
attention from regulators and policymakers. This Article will, ideally, help 
attract that attention. 
Given such dire proclamations, of course, one may wonder why more 
has not been made of the regulatory problems. Indeed, it may seem that 
the dearth of policymaking focus to date suggests that the issue is not, in 
fact, important. One response might be that too many people continue to 
regard futures trading as the province of commodity producers, as well as, 
perhaps, sophisticated traders. After all, regulation itself has not yet 
completely escaped that seemingly stubborn notion.
320
 
Yet, as is always the case, it need not be left to the popular press and 
statements by regulatory agencies to inform investors and onlookers about 
regulatory problems and policymaking needs. Rather, researchers and 
scholars—whether associated with think tanks, academia, or industry 
associations—often perform that function. However, only few of those 
who regularly plumb the depths of unexplored topics have addressed the 
futures markets or futures trading, leave aside the brokers that serve a 
facilitating function for both. 
Whatever the reason for the lack of attention to FCM regulation, it 
should not be construed as a lack of urgency. The financial markets are 
evolving and growing, and the futures markets arguably are a considerable 
part of the reason for those changes. Accordingly, doing right by investors 
and ensuring their future confidence in the financial markets means doing 
right by customers of futures commission merchants . 
 
 
 320. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing how the longstanding goals of futures regulation 
stem from the identity of the longstanding futures traders). 
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